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Abstract
The small firm exemption is a provision of Title VII and the other major federal
employment discrimination laws that exempts very small firms from coverage as “employers.” 
Under the Title VII version of the exemption, for example, an employer is exempt as long as it
employs no more than fourteen employees.  However, a small firm might be affiliated or
integrated with other firms, which collectively employ more than the number of employees
required for coverage.  The single employer doctrine is a rule for treating separately organized
firms as if they were one employer, for purposes of meeting the statutory threshold for coverage. 
Lately, a number of critics lead by Judge Posner have questioned the doctrine’s place in
discrimination law.  The critics charge that the collective bargaining cases in which the doctrine
first evolved are not valid precedents for the doctrine’s use as a rule of coverage in
discrimination cases, and that the doctrine defeats the purposes of the small firm exemption. 
Judge Posner and other critics would treat affiliated but separately organized firms as a single
employer only if it would be appropriate to pierce to corporate veil or hold them jointly liable
under traditional rules of corporate law.  
In this article I explore the origins of the single employer doctrine and its vivid presence
in the background of the Congressional debates leading to the small firm exemption.  I also find
support for the doctrine in the text of Title VII, and I show that the doctrine is not only consistent
with the purpose of the small firm exemption but is necessary to fully achieve the exemption’s
purpose.
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1“Title VII,” as used in this article, means Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§2000e - 2000e-17.
242 U.S.C. §2000e(b). 
3Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to race, color, national origin, religion or
sex, and the small employer exemption is the same in every case.  With regard to race
discrimination, however, another federal law undermines the effectiveness of a small employer
defense. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, popularly known as Section 1981, prohibits race
discrimination without regard to the size of the employer.  See 42 U.S.C. §1981.
Disability discrimination in employment is prohibited by a separate law, Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12111 - 12117.
4The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§621-634, defines “employer”
as person employing at least twenty employees.  29 U.S.C. §630(b). 
5See Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. People of State of Illinois185 U.S. 203, 22
S.Ct. 616, 46 L.Ed. 872 (1902) (rejecting an equal protection challenge against a mine inspection
law exempting mines employing no more than five employees); McLean v. State of Arkansas211
U.S. 539, 29 S.Ct. 206, 53 L.Ed. 315 (1909) (same).
6Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 39 S. Ct. 227, 63 L.Ed. 527 
(1919) (upholding equal protection challenged against workers’ compensation law that exempted
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Introduction
Laws prohibiting discrimination in employment often make an exception for the small
firm.  Title VII,1 which is the model for many other federal and state discrimination laws, sets a
threshold for employer coverage at fifteen employees.2 A firm employing fewer employees is
exempt.  As long as it employs no more than fourteen, it can refuse to hire women, Moslems or
disabled persons, and it will not be in violation of federal discrimination law.3 If it employs as
many as nineteen, but no more, it can terminate and refuse to hire anyone over the age of forty.4
The practice of exempting small firms from employment laws began long before Title
VII.  Early occupational safety laws5 and workers’ compensation laws typically exempted small
firms.6 New Deal-era laws such as the Wagner Act7 and Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)8
small firms); Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484, 96 A. 340 (1916)(same). 
749 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§151 - 169.
852 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§201 - 219. 
9See text accompanying notes 86 - 157, infra. 
10State laws sometimes fill gaps in the coverage of federal laws, but many state laws
incorporate the same exemptions and leave the same small employers outside the scope of
regulation.  See, e.g., Tex. Lab. Code §21.002 (defining “employer” as a “person ... who has 15
or more employees” for purposes of the Texas law against employment discrimination).
Even common law tort claims that might ordinarily apply to any employer regardless of
size might be preempted by a statute that suggests a legislative intent to exempt small employers
from liability for facts or circumstances addressed by the statute.   See, e.g., Gottling v. P.R. Inc.,
61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002) (tort claim based on small employer’s alleged discrimination barred by
statute that exempted small employers from prohibition against discrimination).
11See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447,
123 S.Ct. 1673, 1678-79 (2003).
12The Small Business Administration, for example, counts any business employing fewer
than 500 as “small.”  See Small Business Administration, Table, Small Business Size Standards
matched to North American Industry Classification System (Effective January 5, 2006), available
online at http://www.sba.gov/size/sizetable2002.html.  See also Charles Brown, James Hamilton,
James Medoff, Employers Large and Small, 9 (Harvard Univ. Press 1990).
originally lacked small firm exemptions, but amendments and administrative practices created
protective niches for small firms.9 As a result, an exempt small firm can pay less than the
statutory minimum wage, refuse to pay overtime rates, discharge union supporters, and reject
collective bargaining regardless of the wishes of its employees.10 
The most popular explanation for these exemptions is that a small firm might be
overwhelmed by the burden of compliance.11 However, the exemption relieves only the smallest
of the small.  An exempt firm is a fraction of the size that could qualify as small for many other
regulatory or statistical  purposes.  The Small Business Administration, for example, regards a
firm employing up to 500 employees as “small,”12 but under this standard a firm could be more
than thirty times too large to be exempt from Title VII.   Exempt firms, therefore, tend to be the
sort that provide self-employment as much as profits for their owners.  “ Nearly any of the
Congressional debates that preceded enactment of the major employment laws with small firm
exemptions were animated with references to “corner” stores, entrepreneurs working out of their
garage, family-owned retail and service operations and other independent business people
struggling to provide work for themselves as well as jobs for others despite stifling government
13See Brown, Hamilton and Medoff, supra note 12, at 4-7, 65-74, 87; Marc Linder, The
Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: The “Original” Accumulation
of Capital and the Inversion of Industrial Policy, 6 J.L. & Pol’y 403 (1998).  See also text
accompanying notes 193 - 195, 240 - 245, infra.
14Brian Headd, The Characteristics of Small Business Employees, Monthly Labor Review
(April 2000), p. 13, 14.  The actual number of employees employed by exempt small firms, and
their share of the national workforce,  is probably significantly greater.  The number reported in
Mr. Headd’s article is for employers employing fewer than ten employees, but Title VII exempts
employers employing fewer than fifteen employees. 
15Harry Holzer, Why Do Small Establishments  Hire Fewer Blacks Than Large Ones? 
Discussion Paper no. 1119-97, Institute for Research on Poverty, Dept. of Economics, Michigan
State Univ. (January 1997).   According to Holzer’s research, a small firm of fewer than 15
employees has a .119 probability that the last hire was black.  The probability rises to .145 if the
firm’s workforce is in the 15 to 49 range (within range of Title VII coverage).  The probability
rises even higher, to .242, when the firm’s workforce reaches the range of 50 to 99.  The
probability does not increase, and actually declines somewhat, after the workforce exceeds 100,
which is the point at which many firms become subject to the EEO-1 filing requirement.  See 29
C.F.R. §1602.7.  See also Brown, Hamilton and Medoff, supra note 12, at  86 (describing data
from 1986 indicating that minority employment expanded much more rapidly in firms subject to
EEO reporting requirements).
16Brian Headd, The Characteristics of Small Business Employees, Monthly Labor Review
(April 2000), pp. 13-14.  Many of the “small” firms in this study were large enough to qualify as
“employers” under Title VII, which suggests the possibility that Title VII coverage is not the only
reason why small firms are less likely to hire blacks.  However, other studies show a distinct
increase in the probability that an employer will hire blacks once the employer surpasses the
threshold for coverage under Title VII.  See note 15, supra. Other possible factors include an
employer’s coverage under EEO-1 reporting requirements (for a firm employing at least 100), or
its coverage under affirmative action and reporting requirements for federal contractors.   See W.
Carrington, K. McCue & B. Pierce, Using Establishment Size to Measure the Impact of Title VII
and Affirmative Action, 35 Journal of  Human Resources 503-523 (2000); Jonathan S. Leonard,
The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black Employment,
J. Econ. Perspectives, vol. 4, no. 4, p. 47, 50-51 (1990).
For Hispanics, representation in a workforce is inversely related to firm size, probably
regulation.13 But legislative favoritism for small firms has important implications for the
effectiveness of federal labor policy.  Firms small enough to be exempt from Title VII employ
more than 19 million employees—equal to the entire population of the State of New York or
more than 16 percent of the national workforce.14 The exemption may be one reason why small
firms are much less likely than larger firms to hire a representative number of black employees.15 
According to one recent study, blacks constitute 13.3 percent of the workforces of employers of
more than 500 employees, but only 7.9 percent of the workforces of fewer than ten employees.16 
because many small firms are involved in construction and agriculture, and possibly because
firms in these sectors are particularly likely to rely on undocumented aliens.  Nearly 13 percent of
the employees of firms employing fewer than 10 are Hispanic, but only 9 percent of employees of
firms employing 500 or more are Hispanic.  Headd, supra note 16, at pp. 14, 17.
17See text accompanying notes 254-59, infra.
18Richard Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One, and How
It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 295 (2001).
19See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 123 S.Ct. 1673,
155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003), where the Court considered the employee status of a professional
corporation’s physician shareholders, who also constituted the board of directors.  The Court
described a multi-factor test for determining whether owners, partners, directors and officers are
employees, and it remanded the case for application of the test.
20See, e.g., American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Washington-Baltimore
Local v. N.L.R.B., 462 F.2d 887 (D. C. Cir. 1972) (barring a union’s picketing as a “secondary
boycott” against a “neutral” division of a corporation).  Similarly, the rights of some employees
under the Fair Labor Standards Act depend on the revenue generated by the employing
These figures might obscure the real situation if, as some observers have suggested, small
business owners of all races tend to discriminate in favor of their own race, so that minority
employees in the small firm sector are disproportionately employed by minority businesses.17 
Small firms might be much less diverse than large ones.
The right to claim the small firm exemption—and with it an affirmative defense against a
charge of discrimination—is an important advantage for firms that qualify, and a disappointment
for their applicants and employees.  Not surprisingly, the issue of small firm status is frequently
contested in employment discrimination cases, even though the test for exemption–a headcount
of employees–might seem to be simple and straightforward.  Sometimes there are issues about
who counts as an employee, especially if the employer has delegated a substantial amount of
work to “independent contractors”,18 “partners”,19 or other putative non-employees.  In other
cases there are issues about what entity or set of entities constitute the “employer,” a problem
that is the main topic of this article.
This article deals in particular with the problem of the corporate employer that is part of
or consists of a family of corporations.  For most purposes in the law, each corporation is a single
discrete “person,” the basic unit as to which legal rights and duties attach.  A corporation is a
separate person even if it is owned entirely by another corporation, or by an individual who owns
other incorporated or unincorporated enterprises.   An “employer” can be a corporation, and in
most instances the corporation and the relevant employer are one and the same. In some cases,
however, the relevant employer is more or less than a single corporation.   For purposes of
collective bargaining law or wage and hour law an employer might be an unincorporated division
of a corporation.20 On the other hand, a corporation that is small enough standing alone for an
enterprise, which may be a subpart of a larger corporation.  See 29 U.S.C. sec. 203(r), (s).  See
also the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 2101(a)(1) (defining
“employer” as a “business enterprise” employing a certain number of employees.
21166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019, 120 S.Ct. 526 (1999).
exemption  might find itself swept back into the field of coverage by the “single employer
doctrine,” which treats affiliated and interrelated corporations as if they are one entity–a “single
employer.”  Thus, an exemption for a small employer begs the question:  Who is the employer?
Multiple corporations might be the “employer” under the single employer doctrine when
one corporation owns another, or when to two or more corporations are owned by another entity,
individual or group of individuals.  If a plaintiff can prove that the affiliated corporations also
operate to some degree as a single enterprise, such as by pursuing the same business, serving
each other, and sharing common management and resources, then all the employees of the multi-
corporate enterprise count toward the threshold for employer coverage, frequently with the result
that none of the affiliated firms is exempt, no matter how small its own workforce.  
The doctrine is not clearly stated in the text of Title VII or the other major federal
discrimination statutes. When courts first began to apply the doctrine in employment
discrimination cases in the nineteen-seventies, they relied mainly on the example of collective
bargaining law, where the doctrine has had a particularly vigorous life since the Wagner Act. 
The Wagner Act is no clearer than Title VII in providing a statutory basis for the single employer
doctrine, but the doctrine seems securely rooted in that law because the Supreme Court has twice
approved the doctrine in the context of collective bargaining.  Lately, however, critics including
some judges have questioned the doctrine’s application in employment discrimination cases. 
They have wondered whether the single employer doctrine was a mistake from the start, and
some judges have declined to apply the doctrine in discrimination cases even if they are bound by
higher precedent to apply it in collective bargaining cases.
This article takes a closer look at whether the single employer doctrine appropriately
limits the small firm exemption, particularly in Title VII and the employment discrimination laws
modeled after Title VII.   Part I begins with a brief overview of the exemption and the single
employer doctrine, and with a look at Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in Papa v. Katy Industries,
Inc.21 The consolidated cases in Papa exemplify some  typical settings for the single employer
doctrine, and Judge’s Posner’s opinion presents and clarifies the principle arguments against the
doctrine.  Papa remains the leading judicial authority against the doctrine in employment
discrimination law, and it serves as a convenient starting point for a closer examination of the
debate.
Part II examines one set of the critics’ arguments based on their description of the origins
of the single employer doctrine and its specialized function in collective bargaining law.  I find as
an historical matter that the single employer doctrine is older and serves a much wider variety of
functions than the critics suppose.  In other words, the examples provided by collective
bargaining law and other employment laws are not so easily dismissed as precedents for a more
general application of the single employer doctrine.  More importantly, the history of the single
employer doctrine was a backdrop for Congress’s lively debate about the small firm exemption in
the proceedings that led to Title VII.   Knowing the history of the doctrine is a step toward
answering the question whether Congress intended or expected the doctrine to limit the small
firm exemption.
Next, Part III addresses another set of arguments against the doctrine based on the
perceived lack of support in the text of the statutes, particularly Title VII, and the assumed lack
of other evidence of Congress’s intention to adopt the doctrine.  On closer examination, I find
that the Congressional debates included at least some discussion of the single employer doctrine,
bolstering the view that Congress was aware of the likely application of the doctrine in small
firm cases.  I also find that Title VII’s unusual definition of “person” provides an important and
probably purposeful link to a body of pre-existing law that included the single employer doctrine.
Part IV looks at Judge Posner’s argument that application of the single employer doctrine
is contrary to the purpose of the small firm exemption.  Judge Posner and other critics have
assumed that the small firm exemption’s principle purpose is economic: to relieve very small
firms of the disproportionate burden of compliance.  With respect to this regulatory relief goal, I
find contrary to Judge Posner that there are compelling reasons not to grant the small firm
exemption to many firms that enjoy the benefits of affiliation with a larger firm or family of
firms.  I also find that Congress had other purposes in adopting the exemption, including the
protection of “personal” relationships in the small workplace.  Proper application of the single
employer doctrine for purposes of statutory coverage makes it more likely that the exemption
will be reserved for firms that have the needs envisioned by Congress.  Part V, my conclusion,
offers some observations about how the test for single employer status might be better tailored to
serve its purpose as a limit on the small firm exemption.
I.  Overview: The Small Firm Exemption, 
 The Single Employer Doctrine, and Papa
A.  The Small Firm Exemption
Small firms are exempt from Title VII because the Act defines “employer” as a “person ... 
who has fifteen or more employees.”  Whether an employer is exempt under this rule depends
strictly on the number of its employees.  An exempt employer might engage in any business in
any industry.  It might generate less than a million dollars in revenues, or it might generate
hundreds of millions in revenues.  It might employ unskilled laborers or clerical workers, or it
might employ highly skilled computer software engineers, doctors or lawyers.  No matter what its
business, revenues or types of employees, it is exempt from Title VII and the other major federal
anti-discrimination laws as long as it never exceeds the threshold number of employees.
Qualification for a small firm exemption might have been based on other measures.   The
2220 U.S.C. §203(s). 
23By 1964 most states outside the Old South had adopted civil rights laws, and the fact
that many of these laws included small employer exemptions was widely noted in Congress, both
as an example for federal legislation and as a basis for determining whether federal law exempted
too many or too few employers.  See, e.g., 110 Cong. Record S 6548 (March 30, 1964) (Senator
Humphrey); 110 Cong. Record S 6562 (March 30, 1964) (Senator Kuchel); 110 Cong. Record S
7214 (April 8, 1964) (Memorandum of Senators Clark and Chase). 
Even before the civil rights era, a head count of employees was the usual measure of size
for small firm exemptions in many state labor laws. See notes 5 and 6, supra. 
24A sixth possible explanation, to assure Title VII’s constitutionality by reaching only
businesses certain to have a significant impact on commerce, appears to have been asserted by
opponents of Title VII mainly as a distraction. After all, the Constitutional basis for Title VII was
not the commerce power, it was the Fourteenth Amendment.  House Judiciary Committee’s
Report, No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.(Nov. 20, 1963) (separate minority views of Richard Poff
and William Cramer), in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of
Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, p. 2108 (1978); 110 Cong. Record S 7208-7212
(April 8, 1964) (Senator Clark); 110 Cong. Record S 13079 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Clark).
FLSA, for example, grants a partial exemption to small “enterprises” based on revenue.22 
Counting dollars of revenue is no more arbitrary a test of size than counting heads.  However, a
firm that wants to know whether it is exempt in any particular year can more easily know or
predict the size of its workforce than its revenue, and it can more easily avoid crossing a
threshold based on workforce size.  Moreover, Title VII was preceded by and modeled after two
decades of state civil rights laws and at least a century of other employment regulations that often
granted exemptions based on head counts,23 and this manner of measuring size is consistent with
the likely purposes of a small firm exemption in discrimination law.  Congressional debates
leading to the enactment of Title VII in 1964 and its amendment in 1972 reveal at least five
possible purposes for a small firm exemption: (1) to relieve small firms of the otherwise
disproportionate costs they might bear under the new law; (2) to preserve a right of “personal”
relationships beyond government intervention; (3) to permit racial or ethnic self-help by small
firms and family-owned businesses; (4) to avoid over-extension of the EEOC’s limited resources;
and (5) to defuse at least some business opposition to Title VII and preserve enough support for
its enactment.24 Much more will be said about these purposes and their relevance to the single
employer doctrine in Part IV of this article.
B.  The Single Employer Doctrine
The small firm exemption requires a headcount of the alleged employer’s employees, but
there might be a question about who or what constitutes the “employer.”  An administrative
agency or an individual plaintiff seeking to overcome a small firm defense might argue in favor
25See, e.g., EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 2: Threshold Issues, sec. 2-III-B-1-a-iii,
online at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-B-1-a-iii, (last visited on March
26, 2006) [hereinafter “EEOC Compliance Manual”].
26See, e.g., Hall v. Fanticone, 322 N.J. Super. 302, 730 A.2d 919 (1999); Sweeney v. City
of New York, 4 Misc.3d 834, 837-38, 782 N.Y.S.2d 537, 543 (N.Y. Sup. 2004);  Cf. Clark v.
United Technologies Automotive, Inc.. 459 Mich. 681, 594 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 1999)
(remanding case for determination of whether “economic realities” supported treating owner and
his corporation as a single employer of plaintiff, for purposes of the exclusive remedy defense). 
Cf. Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. 2001) (owner who was “alter ego” of the
corporation he owned was entitled to assert exclusive remedy defense against employee of the
corporation). 
27Whether the test should be stated in the disjunctive or conjunctive is one of many issues
about the test.  In most forums, the requirements for application of the doctrine can be satisfied
with something less than proof of all four factors. See, e.g., EEOC Compliance Manual, note 25,
supra.
28Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.1977); Evans v. McDonald's
Corp., 936 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.1991); Wells v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 421 Mich. 641,
364 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. 1984).
of combining the workforce of the nominal employer with the workforces of affiliated
corporations to reach a total in excess of the threshold for coverage. This argument depends on
the viability and applicability of the single employer doctrine, also known as the “integrated
enterprise” doctrine.25
The idea of treating multiple entities as a single employer is not limited to issues in
collective bargaining or discrimination law.  One finds variations of the doctrine across the board
in employment law, and beginning long before Title VII or the Wagner Act.  The proponent of
the doctrine is usually an employee or enforcement agency seeking to extend statutory coverage
or extend certain employer duties to multiple entities, but an employer can also benefit from
some variations of the doctrine.  In workers’ compensation law, for example, a corporation
affiliated with an injured employee’s nominal employer might claim to be one and the same
employer, in order to assert the employer’s exclusive remedy defense.26 In collective bargaining
law, two or more corporations might assert the single employer doctrine to support their proposal
for a bargaining unit combining employees of both corporations, in order to dilute a union’s
strength and make it more difficult for the union to organize employees.
In brief, the prevailing version of the single employer doctrine in discrimination and
collective bargaining law regards a group of persons—usually multiple corporations—as a single
employer if the facts show (1) common ownership or financial control, (2) common
management, (3) centralized control of labor relations, and/or27 (4) interrelation of operations.28 
The test is far from mathematically precise.  Some degree of common ownership appears to be a
premise of most descriptions of the doctrine in the context of employment discrimination law,
29But see EEOC Compliance Manual, note 25, supra, which takes the position that the
doctrine applies when “the operations of two or more employers are ... so intertwined that they
can be considered the single employer.”  However, it does not appear that the EEOC or any other
party has successfully asserted the doctrine in a reported case without common controlling
ownership.  The best case for application of the doctrine without common ownership might be
where non-profit institutions are not “owned” but are subject to common government or financial
control.  A few courts have entertained application of the doctrine in such cases. See, e.g., Tatum
v. Everhart, 954 F.Supp. 225, 229 (D. Kan. 1997) (but finding that separately incorporated
nonprofit organizations were not a single employer). 
30See text accompanying notes 123, 124, 154-57, infra.
31Title VII’s rules of coverage require the same headcount of employees for public
employers as for private firms.  However, the prevailing view is that the single employer doctrine
does not apply to public entities.  Sandoval v. City of Boulder, Colo., 388 F.3d 1312, 1323 & n. 3
(10th Cir. 2004) (“Absent some indication that the state’s decision was motivated by a desire to
circumvent the civil rights laws or other laws, principles of comity counsel federal courts not to
be too quick to erase organizational dividing lines drawn up by state authorities.”).  Accord, Lyes
v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).
32See generally Walter Siebert & Dawn Webber, Joint Employer, Single Employer, and
Alter Ego, Labor Lawyer (Fall  1987).
33See, e.g., EEOC Compliance Manual, note 25, supra; Sandoval v. City of Boulder,
Colo., 388 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2004). 
but the EEOC advocates a more aggressive view,29 and some variations of the doctrine in
collective bargaining and wage and hour law can apply to separately owned firms.30 For reasons
I explain in the course of this article, I take a more limited view that separately owned and
organized entities merely doing business together cannot be a single employer for purposes of
coverage under discrimination law, even if their operations become closely integrated or
interrelated.  In order for two private firms31 to be a single employer, either one must own the
other or they must have a common owner or parent.  However, even assuming common
ownership is an essential element, none of the various judicial or administrative descriptions of
the doctrine offers a precise threshold or standard for common ownership. Common controlling
ownership is probably very important.  The relative importance of the other factors is also a
matter of dispute.  It is widely agreed, however, that a strong showing for one of the remaining
factors—especially centralized labor relations—can compensate for a weak showing for the
others.32 Many authorities regard a finding of centralized labor relations as very important in
every case.33 
When separate corporations are a “single employer,” they are treated as one entity for one
or more employment law purposes, including satisfaction of statutory coverage thresholds.  In
this regard the single employer doctrine is distinctly different from some other doctrines, such as
the “joint employer” doctrine, that are frequently confused with the single employer doctrine. 
34See Arculeo v. On-Site Sales and Marketing, LLC, 425 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2005); Walter
Siebert & Dawn Webber, Joint Employer, Single Employer, and Alter Ego, Labor Lawyer (Fall 
1987).
35The EEOC also takes the view in its Compliance Manual that if two firms constitute a
“single employer,” an administrative charge against one is a charge against the other, and that
“relief can be obtained from any of the entities that form part of the integrated enterprise.” 
EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 2: Threshold Issues, sec. 2-III-B-1-a-iii, online at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-B-1-a-iii, (last visited on March 26, 2006).
See also Dunn v. Tutera Group, 181 F.R.D. 653 (D. Kan. 1998); E.E.O.C. v. McLemore Food
Stores, Inc., 1978 WL 13922 (W.D. Tenn. 1978).  But this does not necessarily mean that a court
would treat the service of judicial process against one as service of process against the other, or
that a court would hold one liable for the actions of the other or for a judgment against the other. 
The joint employer doctrine recognizes that one employee can have two or more separate
employers, who need not be affiliated by common control or ownership.  Joint employers are not
treated as a single entity.34 For example, one or both might be exempt small firms even if the
combined total of their employees is in excess of the statutory threshold.  
The single employer doctrine is also sometimes confused with other doctrines that have a
potentially more radical effect, effectively piercing the corporate veil and dissolving the legal
separation between two corporate entities or between a corporation and its owner.  The alter ego
doctrine, for example, includes consideration of many of the same factors as the single employer
doctrine, but it includes proof of the owners’ intent to evade the law by separate incorporations. 
Even if the alter ego doctrine is used for a limited purpose in a particular proceeding, the
implications of a finding of intent to evade the law or to defraud employees and their
representatives could have farther-reaching implications.  In contrast, the single employer
doctrine does not require or imply any wrongful intent on the part of the entities that comprise
the employer.  A finding of single employer status does not necessarily taint the separateness of
the affiliated corporations for any other purpose.  The EEOC’s official position in this regard is
more aggressive.  According to the Commission, the single employer doctrine can impose
financial liability on all the affiliated corporations based on the discriminatory act of any one of
them.35 For reasons I explain in the course of this article I take a more limited view, that proof of
the requirements for single employer status for purposes of coverage would not necessarily
justify piercing the corporate veil for purposes of liability without additional circumstances.  The
doctrine serves its most important role in discrimination law simply by denying an exemption
firms that do not really fit within Congress’s likely idea of the exempt class.  Whether the
doctrine has other proper functions in employment discrimination law is a separate issue.
C.   An Example of the Doctrine 
 And its Critics: Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc.
Not very long after Congress enacted Title VII, federal courts held in a number of cases
36See text accompanying notes 170-75, infra. 
37See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir.1983).
38EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 2 (Threshhold Issues), pt. III (Covered Parties),
B.1.a.iii(a), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-B-1-a-iii
39166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019, 120 S.Ct. 526 (1999).
40129 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 1997).
41Id. at 776.
42Id. The Fifth Circuit continues to acknowledge the single employer doctrine.  However,
for purposes of affiliate liability in employment discrimination law the Fifth Circuit applies a
much eviscerated form of the doctrine, in which the proponent ordinarily fails as a matter of law
if he lacks proof that the separately incorporated entity was actually involved in the decision of
which the plaintiff complains.  Johnson v. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 398 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2005).
that the single employer doctrine does limit the small firm exemption.36 Judicial support for the
doctrine appeared to build through the nineteen eighties and early nineties,37 and the EEOC
currently takes a particularly strong position in favor of the doctrine.38 Lately, however, some
courts have questioned whether the single employer doctrine is appropriate for questions of
coverage under the discrimination laws.  A recent example of judicial resistence to the doctrine is
Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc.39 In Papa, Judge Posner wrote for a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that rejected the single employer doctrine for purposes of the
small firm exemption under Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA.  The better rule, Judge Posner
and other critics say, is the one that serves for most other purposes: A corporation stands alone as
a person and as an employer, provided its owners do not give cause to pierce the corporate veil.  
Papa was not the first occasion for a federal court to question whether the doctrine
properly limits the small firm exemption.  An initial problem for the courts has been the
perceived lack of text in the discrimination statutes to support an exception to the usual rule that
each corporation is a separate person.  In Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp.,40 for example, Judge
Jolly of the Fifth Circuit wrote that the ADEA’s definition of “employer” (which is modeled after
the Title VII definition) “plainly contains no basis” for treating separately incorporated entities as
one.41 The court’s dissatisfaction with the single employer doctrine might have been aggravated
by the particular application proposed by the plaintiff, which was to pierce the corporate veil and
extend liability, rather than to overcome the small firm exemption.  In any event, the court found
itself bound by Fifth Circuit precedent not to reject the doctrine out of hand.42
In lieu of a clear statutory mandate for the single employer doctrine, one might look to a
43Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965); South Prairie Construction Co.
v. Local No. 627, 425 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1842, 48 L.Ed.2d 382 (1976). 
44347 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 2003).
45Id. at 85.
46Id., citing Marc Crandley, Note, The Failure of the Integrated Enterprise Test: Why
Courts Need to Find New Answers to the Multiple-Employer Puzzle in Federal Discrimination
Cases, 75 Ind. L.J. 1041, 1059-71 (2000).
47Id., citing Crandley, note 46, supra, at 1065-66.  According to this view, the NLRB’s
jurisdiction is “expansive” because it has authority to address any case in which a labor dispute
might have an impact on commerce.  See also text accompanying notes 92-111 and 117- 121. 
48347 F.3d at 85.
49166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019, 120 S.Ct. 526 (1999).
pair of Supreme Court decisions43 arguably endorsing the doctrine as a matter of federal common
law.  However, the scope of these decisions is open to question.  In each case the Court
considered the single employer doctrine in one of its early settings, collective bargaining.  Critics
urge that the single employer doctrine’s well-established role in collective bargaining does not
support the doctrine’s extension into employment discrimination law. In  Nesbit v. Gears
Unlimited, Inc.,44 for example, Judge Ambro admitted a “surface appeal”to the idea that
collective bargaining laws and employment discrimination laws serve the same purpose—
regulating “employer-employee relations,” and that a doctrine designed for one law might also
serve the other.45 In Judge Ambro’s view, however, the single employer doctrine properly serves
purposes unique to collective bargaining law, such as establishing a collective bargaining unit,46
or fulfilling Congress’s mandate for “expansive” NLRB jurisdiction.47 In contrast, Title VII is a
law of limited jurisdiction, and one important jurisdictional limit is the small firm exemption. 
Judge Ambro believed that allowing complainants to overcome the small firm exemption by
invoking the single employer doctrine would be inconsistent with the exemption’s purpose: “to
spare small companies the considerable expense of complying with the statute’s many-nuanced
requirements.”48 
Uncertainty about the viability of the single employer doctrine was an opportunity for
Judge Posner to offer his own analysis of the problem in Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc.49 In Papa,
Judge Posner argued that the courts should completely reject the single employer doctrine, or at
least to confine it to collective bargaining law.  
Papa was a consolidation of two cases in which employer defendants asserted that they
were too small to be “employers” under federal employment discrimination laws. In the first
case, James Papa sued two affiliated corporations—a parent company and the subsidiary that
50Mr. Walsh’s age discrimination claim was based on the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§630 et seq.  His disability discrimination claim was based on the
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12111 - 12117.  Each of these acts
defines “employer” as a “person” who employs a minimum number of employees.  See 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (twenty employees); 42 U.S.C. §12111(5)(A) (fifteen employees). 
51166 F.3d at 939.  See also Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1998 WL 34078635.  In
the lower court proceedings Papa evidently argued that the parent directed the selection of
employees for layoff, but the district court found otherwise, and its finding was not contested on
appeal.  See Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 1998 WL 142390, p. 3 (N.D. Ill.1998) (unpublished). 
52166 F.3d at 939.
53Id. See also 1998 WL 34179787. 
54166 F.3d at 939; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1998 WL 34078634.
55166 F.3d at 939; Brief of Defendants-Appellees, 1998 WL 34179787.
employed him—for alleged age and disability discrimination.50 Papa lost his job with the
subsidiary after the parent became unhappy with the subsidiary’s poor financial performance and
ordered the subsidiary to close certain manufacturing operations.  Closing these operations
required layoffs, including the elimination of Papa’s job, but it was the subsidiary and not the
parent that selected Papa in particular for layoff.51 When Papa charged age and disability
discrimination, the subsidiary asserted the small firm defense.  Evidently, the subsidiary had
employed too few employees to meet the twenty employee threshold of the ADEA or even the
fifteen employee threshold of the ADA.  But the parent corporation, which controlled 100
percent of the stock in the subsidiary through an intermediate corporate shell, owned many other
subsidiaries collectively employing more than a thousand employees.52 
The companion case, EEOC v. GJHSRT, Inc., presented similar features.  The EEOC
sought relief for Richard Mueser for alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII.  Mueser’s
nominal employer, GJHSRT, employed too few employees to qualify as a covered employer, but
the EEOC also named Frederick Transport Group, Inc., a holding company that owned GJHSRT
and other subsidiaries.  The EEOC alleged that the entire family of corporations constituted a
single employer with more than enough employees to overcome the small employer defense.53 
Both cases offered a plausible basis for the single employer doctrine.  Each nominal
employer was a member of a family of corporations wholly owned by a parent or holding
company, thus satisfying the “common ownership” factor as to any of the affiliated corporations. 
In each case, there was at least some evidence of the second factor: common management.  In
Papa, the parent and subsidiary were governed by the same officers and directors, and the
subsidiary’s managers reported directly to the president of the parent company.54 In GJHSRT, the
parent and subsidiary shared the same president, and two individuals who were primary
shareholders served on both boards of directors.55 As for the third factor,  centralized labor
56166 F.3d at 939; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1998 WL 34078634; Brief of Defendants-
Appellees, 1998 WL 34179787.
57In another case, U.S. v. Schurrer, 156 F.3d 1245, 1998 WL 544308,  p. 1  (Table) (10th
Cir. 1998) (unpublished), the court described the same parent company (Katy Industries) as a
“mini conglomerate” that bought and sold a variety of consumer, industrial and machinery
manufacturing businesses.
58166 F.3d at 939; Brief of Defendants-Appellees, 1998 WL 34179787.
59Brief of Defendants-Appellees, 1998 WL 34179787.
60Id. 
61Id. at 942-43 (courts that rely on the doctrine are “insufficiently sensitive to the bearing
of context on the proper formulation of rules of affiliate liability”).
management relations, the evidence showed that the respective parent companies pooled the
workforces of their subsidiaries, including the employer subsidiaries, into common employee
benefit plans, and to some degree they provided centralized administration of payroll.56
The fourth factor, interrelation of operations, was the weak link for both cases.  Although
the parent corporations provided their subsidiaries with some general administrative services,
such as payroll, neither employer subsidiary was integrated into a common enterprise with its
parent or other affiliated corporations.  Indeed, the facts in Papa do not disclose any connection
between the employer’s manufacture of printing presses and the business of any of the affiliated
companies.57 In GJHSRT the argument for interrelationship of operations was somewhat stronger
because all members of the corporate family engaged in the same type of business: trucking. 
However, Judge Posner’s opinion states that each of the affiliated corporations was engaged in a
“different phase of the trucking business and at a different location.”58 Evidently, the EEOC
failed to present evidence that the different trucking businesses shared customers or facilities, or
were integral parts of a common venture.59
The lower courts in each case granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
based on the small firm defense, finding that the facts did not support treating either family of
corporations as a single employer.  Judge Posner’s opinion affirmed for a completely different
reason.  Judge Posner wholly rejected the single employer doctrine, at least for purposes of the
small firm defense in employment discrimination law.  
Like Judge Jolly in Lusk, Judge Posner evidently found nothing in the language of Title
VII or the other discrimination laws that would support the single employer doctrine.  The Title
VII version of the doctrine, Judge Posner surmised, originated in court decisions that had “copied
verbatim” from collective bargaining law,60 evidently without sufficient forethought.61 In contrast
with the some other jurisdictions, however, the Seventh Circuit lacked decisive precedent for
62Judge Posner discounted dicta in earlier decisions of the Seventh Circuit that appeared
to endorse the doctrine.  None of the earlier Seventh Circuit decisions involved a successful
assertion of the single employer doctrine in an employment discrimination case.  In two Seventh
Circuit cases, Sharpe v. Jefferson Distributing Co., 148 F.3d 676 (7th Cir, 1998), and Rogers v.
Sugar Tree Products, Inc., 7 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 1993), the court found the facts insufficient to
require reversal of district court findings that separately incorporated entities did not constitute
single employers.   In a third Seventh Circuit case,  E.E.O.C. v. State of Illinois, 69 F.3d 167 (7th
Cir. 1995), the court reversed a district court judgment that treated the State of Illinois as the real
employer of teachers employed by local public school districts.  In an opinion written by Judge
Posner, the court rejected the EEOC’s argument that the relationship between the State and the
school districts was analogous to that of a single employer/integrated enterprise.  “The principle
that animates the [single employer] doctrine is not limited to the technical relation of parent to
subsidiary corporation,” Judge Posner wrote, but he found the facts insufficient to support a
single employer claim.  Id. at 171.
63Id. at 940, 942.  Judge Posner cited two situations involving a possibly appropriate
application of the single employer doctrine: Where the combined operations of integrated firms
might satisfy the NLRB’s discretionary jurisdictional standards, and where an appropriate
bargaining unit of employees might include employees of separately incorporated firms in an
integrated enterprise.
64Id. at 940. 
65Id. at 942-43.  See  Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v.
Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965); South
Prairie Construction Co. v. Local No. 627, 425 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1842, 48 L.Ed.2d 382 (1976).
66Id.  
adopting the doctrine in an employment discrimination case.62 Nor was Judge Posner persuaded
by the Supreme Court precedents applying the doctrine in the collective bargaining setting. Like
Judge Ambro in Nesbit, Judge Ponser conceded that “there is an argument” that collective
bargaining law requires a single employer doctrine,63 but he was unenthusiastic for the doctrine
for any purpose.  The doctrine’s four factors, he argued, were vague, unweighted, and frequently
pointed in opposite directions.64 The Supreme Court had sanctioned the doctrine only for
collective bargaining law,65 and the doctrine was properly confined to that purpose.  Transplanted
to employment discrimination law, the single employer doctrine would frustrate the goal of the
small firm exemption, which was “To spare very small firms from the potentially crushing
expense of mastering the intricacies of the antidiscrimination laws, establishing procedures to
assure compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at compliance fail.”66 Judge Posner
explained at some length why it might be good policy to exempt small firms from these burdens,
and why the single employer doctrine is inconsistent with this policy.  Judge Posner’s policy and
economic arguments are examined in greater detail in Part IV of this article.
Although Judge Posner rejected that the single employer doctrine should be used to
67166 F.3d 940-41.
68166 F.3d at 941 (emphasis added).
69Id. 
70Id. at 942. 
71Id. at 943.
extend employer coverage, he offered three situations in which a corporate employer’s affiliation
with another corporation might justify aggregating the two entities’ combined workforces. The
first was where the facts would support piercing the corporate veil to make one corporation liable
for the debts of the other, according to traditional principles.67 The second was where an
enterprise had “split itself up into a number of corporations, each with fewer than the statutory
minimum number of employees, for the express purpose of avoiding liability under the
discrimination laws.”68 The third was where the parent or other affiliated corporation actually
took the action about which the plaintiff complained, such as by ordering the employer subsidiary
to adopt an unlawful policy or to discharge a particular employee for unlawful reasons.69 In
other words, Judge Posner would not treat separate entities as a single employer for purposes of
coverage, unless a court would be justified in extending liability to both entities under traditional
principles (excluding the single employer doctrine).  Neither of the cases before the court in Papa
included facts sufficient to justify disregard of separate incorporation based on the three
scenarios envisioned by Judge Posner.70 Thus, the Seventh Circuit  upheld the lower courts’
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims based on the small firm exemption defense.71
The position of Judge Posner and others who reject the single employer doctrine in
employment discrimination law can be summarized as follows.  First, the NLRB invented the
single employer doctrine to serve special purposes in the law of collective bargaining, and the
doctrine’s function in collective bargaining is distinctively different from its proposed function in
employment discrimination law.  Second, neither Title VII nor the other federal discrimination
statutes provide any textual foundation for the doctrine.  Finally, the legislative history and likely
purpose of the small firm exemption weigh against the single employer doctrine.  The following
sections of this article will take a closer look at each of these arguments.
II.  The Historical Precedent for the Single Employer Doctrine
Critics of the single employer doctrine typically assume that the doctrine evolved for
purposes unique to the Wagner Act and different from the purposes for which plaintiffs and the
EEOC seek to enlist the doctrine in employment discrimination cases.  The history of the
doctrine is actually much more complex and in many respects contrary to the critics’
assumptions.  An accurate account is important for several reasons.  First, the doctrine’s history
may be relevant to the effect and scope of the Supreme Court’s decisions upholding the doctrine
in specific contexts.  Of course, the mere fact that the Wagner Act and Title VII are two distinctly
72See Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553-56, 57 S.Ct. 592,
602-604 (1937).  See also ames W. Ely, Jr., “The Railroad System Has Burst Through State
Limits”: Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830-1920, 55 Ark. Law Rev. 933 (2003)
73Davis v. Alexander, 269 U.S. 114, 46 S.Ct. 34, 70 L.Ed. 186 (1925)(“Where one
railroad company actually controls another and operates both as a single system, the dominant
company will be liable for injuries due to the negligence of the subsidiary company.”); Lehigh
Valley R. Co. v. Dupont, 128 F. 840, 845-46 (2d Cir.  1904);  Ross v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 21
Gummere 536, 148 A. 741 (N.J. Err. & App. 1930).  See also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond
Concrete Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 118 A. 279, 284-85 (Md. 1922) (discussing tort liability of
common carriers).
74See, e.g., Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Delachesa, 145 F. 617 (2d Cir. 1906); St. Louis &
S.F.R. Co. v. Arms, 136 S.W. 1164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
75Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, codified at 45 U.S.C. secs. 51 - 60.
different laws might be reason enough to deny that the Court’s decisions under the Wagner Act
compel any particular interpretation of Title VII.  The greater significance of history is its
usefulness in understanding Congress’s likely knowledge, experience, and intent in adopting the
small firm exemption.  History makes a persuasive case for concluding that Congress anticipated
the single employer doctrine as a limit on the small firm exemption.
A.  Pre-Wagner Act Origins of the Single Employer Doctrine
Describing the single employer doctrine as a peculiar outgrowth of the Wagner Act is to
suggest that the doctrine is an unnatural and unwelcome interloper in employment discrimination
law or anywhere else beyond its original domain.  But this description of the doctrine’s origin
overlooks the doctrine’s use for a variety of purposes in employment relations before the Wagner
Act.  In 1935 when Congress enacted the Wagner Act, the idea of treating multiple corporations
as if they were a single employer for purposes of employment law was neither novel nor
particularly controversial.   The idea was partly rooted in an even earlier set of  laws regulating
the employee relations of railroads.  
The railroad industry was an early testing ground for federal regulation of labor relations
because its effect on interstate commerce was indisputable at a time when the Commerce power
was still quite limited.72 As a result, early federal labor law was shaped in part by the law of
common carriers.  One important aspect of the law of common carriers was that a passenger
injured by one incorporated railroad could sue another corporation that dominated the “system”
of interlocking railroad corporations of which the first corporation was a part.73 It was no great
stretch for the courts to apply the same approach for the benefit of injured railroad workers in
common law personal injury actions.74 When Congress enacted the Federal Employers Liability
Act in 1908,75 the courts continued the practice of treating related railroad corporations as a
76Erie R. Co. v. Krysienski, 238 F. 142 (2d Cir.  1916); Eddings v. Collins Pine Co., 140
F.Supp. 622 (D.C. Cal. 1956); Conry v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 112 F.Supp. 252, 255 (D.C. Pa.
1953); Eastern Ry. Co. of New Mexico v. Ellis, 153 S.W. 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Wichita
Falls & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 53 Okla. 463, 157 P. 112 (1915).  Treating separately
incorporated railroads as if they were one was an exception to the rule, already well established at
the beginning of the Twentieth Century, that separately incorporated businesses, including
railroads, are separate legal entities.  See Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 205 U.S. 364, 27
S.Ct. 513 U.S. (1907).
77The earliest substantial federal regulation of labor relations in the railway industry
occurred during World War I, when the federal government seized the railroads and controlled
relations with the unions.  Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, c. 418, 39 Stat. 619, 645.  See
also Pennsylvania System Board of Adjustment of Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees v. Pennsylvania R Co, 1 F.2d 171 (3d
Cir. 1924) (describing the wartime seizure). 
At the end of the War, Congress enacted the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, ch.
91, 41 Stat. 456, 469 (1920), to resolve labor disputes by arbitration.   However, in Pennsylvania
R. Co. v. U.S. Railroad Labor Board, 261 U.S. 72, 43 S.Ct. 278 (1923), the Supreme Court held
that the Railroad Labor Board’s decisions were unenforceable except by force of public opinion.
 
78See Pennsylvania R. R. System and Allied Lines Federation No. 90 v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 267 U.S. 203, 205, 45 S.Ct. 307, 307, 69 L.Ed. 574 (1925).  The Pennsylvania Railroad
system’s family tree is outlined in Robert T. Netzlof, Corporate Geneology: The Pennsylvania
Railroad, online at  http://broadway.pennsyrr.com/rail/prr/Corphist/prr1.html. See also New
York Central Switchmen’s Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 135 F.2d 785,
791  (D.C. Cir. 1943) (describing the New York Central Railroad system and the unions that
represented employees of the carriers in that system).
79The Railway Labor Board had no enforceable authority under the Transportation Act. 
Its function was mainly to provide a public forum where the force of public opinion might weigh
on the parties and force them to end their dispute. See  Pennsylvania R. Co. v. U.S. Railroad
Labor Board, 261 U.S. 72, 43 S.Ct. 278 (1923).
single carrier.76
Railroads also provided the first setting for a federal law of collective bargaining.  During
the early twentieth century, when federal law depended mainly on voluntary compliance with
government mediation,77 unions representing railway workers sometimes organized according to
systems of affiliated railways, such as the “Pennsylvania System” which combined a number of
separately incorporated railroads.78 In the early stages of collective bargaining law it was purely
a matter of private arrangement between the parties whether a union treated a group of railroad
corporations as a single employer and whether the affiliated corporations behaved as a single
employer.79 The practice began its evolution into a rule of law in 1926, when Congress enacted
80Act of May 20, 1926, c. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1920).
81National Mediation Board, First Annual Report (for fiscal year ending June 30, 1935),
p. 22, quoted in Switchmen’s Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 135 F.2d
785, 791  (D.C. Cir. 1943) (upholding the single carrier doctrine).  
82Act of June 7, 1934, c. 426, 48 Stat. 926 (1934), codified at 45 U.S.C. §151 First.
83See Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Intern., Inc., 328 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2003) at 751.
84Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
85See, e.g., Consolidated Realty Co. v. Dyers, Finishers and Bleachers Federation, 137
N.J. Eq. 413, 45 A.2d 132 (N.J.Ch. 1946); Newark Ladder & Bracket Sales Co. v. Furniture
the Railway Labor Act80 and granted real enforcement authority to the Railway Labor Board. 
Over the next decade, the RLB developed a line of precedent for treating affiliated railroads as a
“single carrier” for purposes of collective bargaining.  Under the single carrier rule, employees of
multiple affiliated corporations could be combined into a single unit to bargain collectively with
the carrier system:
If the operations of a subsidiary are jointly managed with operations of other carriers and
the employees have also been merged and are subject to the direction of a single
management, then the larger unit of management is taken to be the carrier rather than the
individual subsidiary companies.81
In 1934 Congress codified the doctrine by amending the RLA’s definition of “carrier” to
include “any railroad ... and any company which is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by
or under common control with any carrier by railroad and which operates any equipment or
facilities or performs any service” for transportation by railroad.82 With this endorsement, the
single carrier rule became the basis not only for system-wide bargaining units but also for
extending the RLB’s authority to firms that, standing alone, were not “carriers” but were
affiliated with carriers.83
At about the same time, state courts were developing still another use for a single
employer doctrine as part of the of common law of secondary boycotts in collective bargaining. 
In a secondary boycott, a union attempts to bring additional pressure to bear against a particular
employer (the “primary” employer) by threatening to induce a strike or other action against
another employer (the “secondary” or “neutral” employer) to force the neutral employer to cease
doing business with the primary employer.  Until the Taft-Hartley Act,84 the states prohibited or
restricted secondary boycotts mainly as a matter of tortious interference with the neutral’s
business, but a union might assert the defense that the putative neutral was not really separate
from the primary employer or was not neutral in the dispute.  In some cases state courts held that
separately incorporated employers could be treated as one, exposing the putative neutral
employer to the same picketing as the primary employer.85
Workers Union Local 66, 125 N.J. Eq. 99, 4 A.2d 49 (N.J.Ch. 1939); Hydrox Ice Cream Co. v.
Doe, 159 Misc. 642, 289 N.Y.S. 683 N.Y.Sup. (1936).  But see State v. Casselman, 69 Idaho
237, 205 P.2d 1131 (Idaho 1949) (refusing to disregard separate incorporation for purposes of
secondary boycott law).
8629 U.S.C. secs. 159(c)(1), 160(a). 
87See the comments of Judge Ambro, at text accompanying notes 46-48, supra, and Judge
Posner, at text accompanying note 63, supra.  See also Tatum v. Everhart, 954 F.Supp. 225, 228
(D. Kan. 1997); Note, The Failure of the Integrated Enterprise Test: Why Courts Need to Find
New Answers to the Multiple-Employer Puzzle in Federal Discrimination Cases, 75 Ind. L.J.
1041, 1052-53 (2000).
B.  The Wagner and Taft Hartley Acts
The single employer doctrine’s headwaters may lie in the early railway labor and tort
laws, but the doctrine’s robust evolution and current notoriety are due mainly to the Wagner Act. 
The Wagner Act extended federal collective bargaining law to any labor dispute “affecting
commerce,” without limitation to any particular industry.86 The Act was also the charter for a
new generation of labor lawyers, and the single employer doctrine became part of their language. 
The single employer doctrine continued its evolution as a multi-purpose tool in the hands
of the National Labor Relations Board.  Critics who oppose extension of the doctrine beyond
collective bargaining assert that the Board’s uses for the doctrine were unique to collective
bargaining.  To be sure, most of the NLRB’s applications for the doctrine have no clear corollary
in employment discrimination law.  However, one of the Board’s earliest uses for the doctrine
was to reach firms that might be exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction unless they were combined
with affiliated firms into a single employer.  Critics find this use of the doctrine distinguishable
from the usual small firm/single employer dispute under Title VII.  According to the critics, the
Board developed the single employer doctrine as one of a set of rules under which the Board
relinquished some of its otherwise “expansive” jurisdiction.87 Indeed, the Board has frequently
used the single employer doctrine to retrieve authority over small firms that would otherwise fall
outside the Board’s self-imposed jurisdictional standards.  However, a full account of the Board’s
practices reveals that the Board’s first use of the doctrine was to secure the widest jurisdiction
possible.  In any event, a multi-purpose single employer doctrine was so well known and
established in collective bargaining and other aspects of employment law by 1964 that the
drafters of Title VII certainly must have anticipated its potential effect on the small firm
exemption.
The text of the Wagner Act did not demand a single employer doctrine.  In contrast with
the Railway Labor Act, the Wagner Act’s declaration of a single employer doctrine was subtle at
best, and arguably fictive.  The only language in the Act that could be viewed as an indirect
8829 U.S.C. §152(1) (emphasis added).
89One other statute of the New Deal era that contained this definition of “person” was the
Walsh-Healey Act, Ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), codified at 41 U.S.C. §§35 - 45.  The Walsh-
Healey Act required federal contracts for the manufacture or furnishing of “materials, supplies,
articles or equipment” to abide by certain minimum terms and conditions of employment. 
Coverage under the Act extended to contractors regardless of annual revenue or workforce size,
although coverage did depend on the amount of the particular contract.  Consequently there was
little occasion to apply a single employer doctrine to extend coverage to small firms.  But see U.
S. v. Davison Fuel & Dock Co., 371 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that separately
incorporated enterprises, subject to common ownership, constituted the manufacturer of goods
subject to the Act’s minimum employment standards, and that the owner of these enterprises was
responsible for the affiliated companies’ compliance)..
9029 U.S.C. §159(c)(1).
9129 U.S.C. §160(a).
92One of the industries most obviously “affecting commerce,” the railroads, were already
subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§151 - 163, and Congress denied the NLRB any
authority over that industry.  29 U.S.C. §152(2).  Thus, in the worst case scenario, the Court’s
very restrictive view of interstate commerce could have left Board with only a small portion of
confirmation of the single employer doctrine was the Act’s unusual definition of “person:”
“person” includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in cases under Title 11,
or receivers.88
This definition, which suggests that “one or more ... corporations” could be a single “person” for
purposes of federal collective bargaining law, was apparently unprecedented as a statutory
definition of “person,” and rarely followed in other statutes89—until thirty years later when
Congress borrowed the same definition for Title VII.
Although the Act’s definition of “person” might have provided the statutory basis for a
single employer doctrine, it did not clearly provide any reason for such a doctrine.  The Act
lacked a small firm exemption. At the time, a small firm exemption would have seemed
superfluous, because there were serious doubts whether a federal law regulating more than
interstate transportation or communications could survive constitutional review.  The limits of
Congress’s power being uncertain and likely to be narrow, Congress drafted the Wagner Act to
reach as far the Supreme Court might ultimately permit.  It authorized the NLRB to resolve
employee representation disputes “affecting commerce,”90 and to prevent unfair labor practices
“affecting commerce.”91 If the newly authorized Board reached too far, the Court could reign the
Board back to the limits of Congress’s constitutional power to regulate commerce, and the
essence of the Act would survive for labor disputes indisputably “affecting commerce.”92 If the
the U.S. economy in its jurisdiction.
93247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed. 1101 (1918).
94Id. at 272, 38 S.Ct. at 531, quoting Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v.
Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 35 S. Ct. 902, 59 L. Ed. 1397 (1915).
95Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 NLRB 1 (1935).
96Many of the events that were the subject of the proceeding occurred at the system’s
Pittsburgh garage.  Id. at 5-6.
97Id. at 3. 
98Id. at 4.
99See also Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.,and its Affiliated
Companies, 4 NLRB 71, 77-78 (1937) (summarizing evidence that the respondent companies
formed a “unitary and integrated system” with a clear impact on interstate commerce);
Court moved toward a more permissive view, the Board’s realm would automatically expand
with the Court’s view.
At the outset, small firms had little to fear from the Wagner Act unless they were directly
involved in classic interstate activity, like transporting goods across state lines.  Considering the
Court’s decisions before 1935, even some very large employers might have expected to fall
outside the NLRA’s coverage.  They could have taken comfort in cases such as Hammer v.
Dagenhart,93 where the Court invalidated Congress’s first attempt at a child labor law.  In that
case, the Court held that federal authorities lacked the power to seize goods manufactured by
young children even if the goods were destined to cross state lines or did in fact cross state
lines.94
It was against this backdrop that the NLRB decided its first case, an unfair labor practice
proceeding against the Greyhound Bus Lines family of corporations.  The Greyhound group
operated a number of separately incorporated bus lines and supporting businesses such as repair
and maintenance garages.95 One might have thought a bus system transporting passengers across
state lines was clearly engaged in interstate commerce, and that its labor disputes were
undoubtedly matters “affecting commerce.” The Board, however, left nothing to chance,
particularly the chance that the Court might view separately incorporated garages and
maintenance facilities as purely intrastate enterprises.96 In asserting its jurisdiction, the Board
emphasized that the respondent corporations operated “an integrated system”97 of interstate
transportation; that a holding company owned stock interests in all of these corporations and had
a controlling interest in most of them; and that common control and integration were
strengthened by “a system of interlocking officers and directors.”98 In sum, the Board stated
most of the elements of what observers later described as the single employer or integrated
enterprise rule.99 The Board did not specifically refer to precedents under the Railway Labor Act,
Bloedel-Donovan Lumber Mills, 8 NLRB 230 (1938). 
100N.L.R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937), reversed, 303
U.S. 261, 58 S.Ct. 571, 82 L.Ed. 831(1938).  The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s
decision for reasons not pertinent to this discussion.
101Id. at 180.
102The main opinion of the court did not mention the argument; and the concurring
opinion of Justice Biggs tersely rejected it, stating only that “There was ample evidence before
the Board to sustain its finding that the discharged employees were in fact mainly employed by
the respondent ... for the benefit of subsidiary corporations engaged in actual transportation
operations in interstate commerce.”  Id.
103298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936).
104Id. at 298, 56 S.Ct. at 867.
105See  Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, Aug. 30, 1935, c. 824, §§ 1 to 23, 49
Stat. 991, repealed, Act of Apr. 26, 1937, c. 127, § 20(a), 50 Stat. 90.
but it may be more than a coincidence that the NLRB’s first use of the single employer doctrine
involved an integrated transportation system. 
The Board found that the respondent companies and the entities with which they were
affiliated had committed a number of unfair labor practices, including unlawfully discharging
employees.  The named respondents included some, but not all of the companies in the
“integrated” Greyhound system, and the named corporations petitioned the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit for review of the Board’s decision.100 They asserted to the court that they were
not the employers of the employees in question, and that the real employers were separately
incorporated subsidiaries not named as respondents.101 The court rejected the argument with
scarcely a word.102 The Board, with the Third Circuit’s blessing, had run roughshod over
Greyhound’s separately incorporated units and treated them as one employer, evidently to assure
that local subsidiaries would not escape the Board’s interstate commerce-based jurisdiction, and
perhaps to avoid the necessity of naming each entity as a respondent for all the unfair labor
practice charges.
Within a few months of the Board’s Greyhound Lines decision, the Supreme Court
seemed to confirm the Board’s worst fears about jurisdiction.  In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,103 the
Court reaffirmed its view that “commerce” equated with “transportation, purchase, sale, and
exchange of commodities between the citizens of the different states.”104 On this ground, the
Court quashed a law regulating collective bargaining in the coal industry, because mining and
production of goods were not interstate commerce.105 For a moment, the Board seemed destined
106From 1935 to 1937, federal district courts issued nearly 100 injunctions against the
NLRB based on Carter and on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935), invalidating the National
Recovery Act.
107301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937).
108The Court implicitly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart in Jones & Laughlin Steel. The
official notice of death arrived four years later in U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17, 61 S.Ct.
451, 458, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941). 
109306 U.S. 601, 59 S.Ct. 668, 83 L.Ed. 1014 (1939).
110Id. at 606, 59 S.Ct. at 671.
111Id.  at 606, 59 S.Ct. at 672.
112See Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 3 NLRB 622 (1937); C. A. Lund Company, 6
NLRB 423 (1938); Waggoner Refining Company, Inc., 6 NLRB 731 (1938);  Royal Warehouse
Corp. 8 NLRB 1218 (1938); Bloedel-Donovan Lumber Mills, 8 NLRB 230 (1938); The Calco
Chemical Company, 13 NLRB 34 (1939); Dixie Motor Coach Corporation and Sunshine Bus
Lines, Inc., 25 NLRB 869 (1940); Alexander Film Co., 36 NLRB 57 (1941); Shenango Penn
Mold Co., 19 NLRB 328 (1940).
to rule over comparatively few employers of any size.106 The following year, however, the Court
issued its decision in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,107 adopting the broad view of the
commerce power.  The Board’s statutory jurisdiction, drawn to reach as far as the commerce
power might permit, suddenly stretched to include nearly any but the very tiniest of employers.108 
Jones & Laughlin Steel was quickly followed by N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt,109 rejecting an employer’s
argument that it was beyond the Board’s reach by virtue of the relatively small part of its
business connected to an intestate passage of goods.  Congress’s power extended to all commerce
“be it great or small.”110 For purposes of statutory coverage, the amount of interstate commerce
was important “only to the extent that Congress ... excluded commerce of small volume from the
operation of its regulatory measure.”111 But Congress had imposed no such limits on the NLRB’s
jurisdiction.
The upshot of Jones & Laughlin Steel and Fainblatt was that the Board’s statutory
jurisdiction and responsibility extended not only to very large employers and workforces but also
to a great many small ones.  The single employer doctrine was no longer necessary to enlarge the
Board’s jurisdiction.  But the doctrine still had important roles to play in early NLRB practice. 
Above all, the NLRB used the single employer / integrated enterprise doctrine in the same
manner as the RLB: to establish bargaining units combining workforces of multiple “integrated”
corporations.112 This particular use of the doctrine was not necessarily to the disadvantage of
employers.  An employer might prefer a larger bargaining unit to dilute the union’s support
among employees.  Sometimes, it was the affiliated corporations who sought the larger
113See Waterman Steamship Corporation, 10 NLRB 1079 (1939). 
114See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp., 85 NLRB 1519, 1520 (1949).
115See, e.g., Waggoner Refining Company, Inc., 6 NLRB 731 (1938); Roemer Bros.
Trucking Co., 13 NLRB 549 (1939); Dixie Motor Coach Corporation and Sunshine Bus Lines,
Inc., 25 NLRB 869 (1940); Condenser Corporation of America, 22 NLRB 347, 449 (1940); The
Middle West Corporation, 28 NLRB 540 (1940); R. M. Johnson and G. F. Sharp, 41 NLRB 263
(1942). 
116Condenser Corporation of America, 22 NLRB 347, 449 (1940); National Shoes, Inc.,
103 NLRB 438, 440 n. 2 (1953); A. E. Nettleton Co., Nettleton Shops, Inc., 108 NLRB 1670,
1676 n. 3 (1954).
11727 NLRB 1100, 1101, n. 2 (1940). 
11827 NLRB at 1101, n. 2.  See also Albert Love Enterprises, 66 NLRB 416, 418 (1946);
Royal Palm Furniture Factories, Inc., 74 NLRB 1281, 1282 (1947); Liddon White Truck Co., 76
NLRB 1181 (1948).  
119N.L.R.B. v. Pease Oil Company, 279 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1960) (“Early in its
history, however, the Board came to the conclusion that if it were to take cognizance of all
complaints within its statutory grant of power it would be unable to decide any complaint with
bargaining unit.113
The single employer doctrine also served other convenient purposes for the NLRB. 
While the effect on commerce was much easier to prove after Jones & Laughlin Steel and
Fainblatt, it was still the General Counsel’s burden to prove it.  The single employer doctrine
saved the General Counsel the burden of proving the effect on commerce of each separately
incorporated part of an integrated enterprise.114 The Board even used the single employer
doctrine to impose its remedies on the entirety of the enterprise in a manner that effectively
pierced the corporate veil, making each separately incorporated entity liable for the misdeeds of
any other member of the same enterprise.115 As noted earlier, the Act provided no definitively
clear basis for a single employer doctrine for any of these purposes.  In some of its earliest
precedent-setting cases, however, the Board cited, without much explanation, the Wagner Act’s
definition of “person” as including “corporations.”116 
Not long after Feinblatt, the NLRB began to develop the rules of discretionary
jurisdiction with which the single employer doctrine is frequently associated today.  In 1940 the
Board hinted at what was to come in Forest City Manufacturing Co.:117 “[T]he Board has
jurisdiction which it may exercise at its discretion,” but “[t]he Board considers this case a proper
one for the exercise of its jurisdiction.118 The NLRB’s reservation of discretion was in
anticipation that its now near-plenary jurisdiction might overwhelm its administrative
resources.119 Initially the Board declined jurisdiction case-by-case.  The single employer doctrine
the thoroughness and promptitude necessary to achieve the objectives of the Act. “); N.L.R.B. v.
Marinor Inns, Inc., 445 F.2d 538, 541 (5th Cir. 1971).
At first, the statutory basis for the NLRB’s discretion to refuse jurisdiction over certain
classes of cases was uncertain.  The Act states that the NLRB is “empowered” to prevent unfair
labor practices. 29 U.S.C. 160(a).  With respect to representation proceedings, the Act states that
the NLRB “shall” conduct a hearing if it has “reasonable cause to believe” the matter affects
commerce.  29 U.S.C. 159(c)(1).  The Supreme Court, having declared the NLRB’s statutory
jurisdiction in all cases involving more than “de minimis” effect on commerce, acknowledged
the NLRB’s discretion to decline jurisdiction in Polish Nat. Alliance of U.S. v. N.L.R.B., 322
U.S. 643, 64 S.Ct. 1196, 88 L.Ed. 1509 (1944). 
120See, e.g., Victor Hosiery Co., 86 NLRB 195, 196-97 (1949); N. B. Quarles, 83 NLRB
697, 708 (1949); North Memphis Lumber Co. 81 NLRB 745, 746 (1949);  G. E. Tyner and A.
Petrus, 81 NLRB 380, 381 (1949); A. B. Fletcher, 78 NLRB 1215, 1215, n.2 (1948)
121Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, tit. I, §101, 61 Stat. 151, codified at 29 U.S.C. 164(c)(1).
122See Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 NLRB 635 (1950):
The Board has determined that it will exercise jurisdiction over those enterprises which
affect commerce by virtue of the fact that they furnish goods or services necessary to the
operations of other employers engaged in commerce, without regard to other factors,
where such goods or services are valued at $50,000 per annum or more, and are sold to:
(a) public utilities or transit systems; (b) companies which function as instrumentalities
and channels of interstate and foreign commerce and their essential links; or (c)
enterprises engaged in producing or handling goods destined for out-of-State shipment, or
performing services outside the State, in the value of $25,000 per annum or more. This
standard reflects, in large measure, the results reached in the Board’s past decisions
disposing of similar jurisdictional issues.
Id. at 636.  Thereafter, the Board developed more specialized standards for particular industries. 
See Patrick Hardin & John Higgins, eds., 2 The Developing Labor Law 2152-53 (2001).
was simply one set of facts to show that the impact on commerce was more than “de minimis”
and to distinguish the NLRB’s exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in one case from its rejection
in another.120 Congress validated the practice in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, but demanded
objective standards to distinguish “employers” by “class or category” according to their likely
impact in commerce.121 Three years later the Board declared fixed, objective, employer-based
standards for declining jurisdiction,122 and it was only then that single employer doctrine became
an essential part of the rules for the Board’s discretionary jurisdiction.   
The Board’s employer standards for discretionary jurisdiction constitute a small firm
exemption.  Owing perhaps to their original purpose—to measure prospective impact on
commerce—the standards for most industries are based on the dollar volume of a firm’s
123See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Marinor Inns, Inc., 445 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1971); Seeler v.
Williams, 1977 WL 1810 (N.D.N.Y., 1976) (unpublished) (granting the Board a temporary
injunction against a restaurant).  
124See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Reed, 206 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.  1953).
125Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, ch. 120, §501, 61 Stat. 161.
126See, e.g., Local 705, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of America v. Willett, Inc., 614 F.Supp. 932 (D.C.Ill. 1985).  See generally Stephen F.
Befort, Labor Law and the Double-Breasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and
business, rather than the number of its employees.  A firm with few employees but revenues in
excess of the applicable threshold cannot claim an exemption, while a firm with revenue below
the applicable threshold might be exempt no matter how many workers it employs.  The single
employer doctrine, however, reclaims many small firms for the Board’s jurisdiction, just as it
extends jurisdiction under Title VII.   A separately incorporated firm with little revenue might be
combined with affiliated corporations, and together these corporations might surpass the Board’s
specific revenue threshold for that particular industry.
In some ways, the NLRB’s use of the single employer doctrine for reasserting its
jurisdiction has been particularly aggressive. In particular, the Board has not always required that
the entities constituting a single employer share any common ownership.  This practice by the
Board stems from the ultimate question of jurisdiction: whether there was a labor dispute
“affecting commerce.”  For purposes of predicting the effect of a labor dispute on commerce,
common ownership of firms may be much less important than other forms of interdependence. 
For example, the Board has sometimes measured the combined effect on commerce of separately
owned restaurants and motels that occupied the same physical structure.123 Similarly, in the
construction industry, in which a multitude of independently owned might participate in a single
large construction enterprise, the Board and the courts have applied the single employer doctrine
without evidence of common ownership.124
Was the Board’s further development of the single employer doctrine for purposes of
discretionary jurisdiction consistent with Congress’s demand for objective standards based on
“employer” class and category?   The answer depends at least in part on what Congress might
have meant by “employer” when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.   Significantly, Section 501 of
the Taft-Hartley Act provided that the term “employer” would have “the same meaning” as in the
Wagner Act,125 and by 1947 the NLRB was clear in its view of the Wagner Act that an
“employer” could be more than one corporation. Arguably, Congress implicitly endorsed the
single employer doctrine.  At the very least, Congress missed a ripe occasion to object.
Following the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board and the courts found at least two other uses for
the single employer doctrine in the law of collective bargaining.  First, the NLRB and the courts
used the doctrine to extend duties under one corporation’s collective bargaining agreement to an
affiliated corporation that shared control over an interrelated workforce.126 Second, the Board
Alter Ego Doctrines and a Proposed Reformulation, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 67 (1987).
127Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 949 F.2d 1241, 1258-59
(3d Cir. 1991); Local No. 24, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America v. N. L. R. B., 266 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Penello for and on Behalf of
N. L. R. B. v. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Washington-Baltimore
Local, AFL-CIO, 291 F.Supp. 409 (D.Md. 1968).  See generally Befort, supra note 126, at 75-76.
See also Bowater S. S. Co. v. Patterson, , 303 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
860, 83 S.Ct. 116, 9 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962) (Norris-La Guardia Act precluded shipowner’s petition
for an injunction against picketing motivated by the union’s dispute with an affiliated foreign
corporation).
128See Hardin & Higgins, note 122, supra, at 2152-53.
129276 Ala. 93, 159 So.2d 452 (1963)
130276 Ala. at 97-98, 159 So.2d at 456.
131The importance of the issue and the Court’s interest in the case was signaled by its June
1, 1964 order inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief in the case.  377 U.S. 950, 84 S.Ct.
1630 (1964).
132Radio and Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service of
Mobile, Inc., 379 U.S. 812, 85 S.Ct. 30, 13 L.Ed.2d 26 (1964) .
and the federal courts used the single employer doctrine in secondary boycott cases in the same
fashion as state courts before the Taft-Hartley Act, holding that picketing was not “secondary” if
the putative neutral was part of an integrated enterprise combining the primary employer and the
putative neutral.127
By the time Congress had begun the debates leading to the enactment of Title VII, the
single employer doctrine was in full flower,128 and the issue of its validity was reaching a
crescendo.  In late 1963, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued what appeared to be a rejection of
the single employer doctrine in Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc. v. Local 1264, Intern. Broth. of
Elec. Workers.129 In that case, the Alabama court held that an employer involved in a certain
labor dispute was too small to come within the bounds of the NLRB’s discretionary jurisdiction,
and therefore federal law did not preempt the exercise of state court jurisdiction over the
matter.130 The union involved in the dispute filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and its
petition was before the U.S. Supreme Court at the very time Congress was debating Title VII and
the proposed small firm exemption.131 
The Court granted the union’s petition three months after Congress enacted Title VII,132
and in early 1965 the Court reversed the Alabama court in a terse, two paragraph opinion: 
133Radio and Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256, 85 S.Ct. 876, 877, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965)
134Id.   A decade later, the Court upheld the application of the single employer doctrine to
bind a corporation to an affiliated corporation’s collective bargaining agreement, conditioned on
a determination that the employees of the two firms constituted an appropriate bargaining unit. 
South Prairie Const. Co. v. Local No. 627, Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 425
U.S. 800, 803, 96 S.Ct. 1842, 1843, 48 L.Ed.2d 382 (1976).
[I]n determining the relevant employer, the Board considers several nominally separate
business entities to be a single employer where they comprise an integrated enterprise.
The controlling criteria, set out and elaborated in Board decisions, are interrelation of
operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations and common
ownership. The record made below is more than adequate to show that all of these factors
are present [in this case].133 
Having approved the application of the single employer test, the Court held that federal law
preempted the application of the Alabama law to the labor dispute.134 The Court’s opinion
appeared to take the single employer doctrine for granted, for purposes of preemption, and
without considering any issue as to its legitimacy.  Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion is a measure
of the maturity of the doctrine had achieved even before the question had reached the Court.  
In sum, by 1964 the single employer doctrine was a widely acknowledged part of the law
that was the backdrop for the enactment of Title VII.  True, the leading proponent of the
doctrine—the NLRB—had used the doctrine only in cases involving some aspect of collective
bargaining law, but the Board’s original and most frequent uses of the doctrine were to extend
the reach of its statutory jurisdiction and to limit the availability of the small firm exemptions in
its “employer” standards of coverage.  In other words, the Board had used the doctrine in ways
that were not at all peculiar to collective bargaining law.  In fact, the Board’s use of the doctrine
was very similar to the doctrine’s potential use in Title VII cases.  Congress had implicitly
endorsed the Board’s concept of  “employer” in the Taft-Hartley Act, and the courts had shown
no resistence to the doctrine in principle.  The Supreme Court’s casual and unanimous
endorsement of the doctrine a few months after the enactment of Title VII reflects the doctrine’s
general acceptance in the law during the time of the Title VII-small firm exemption debates.
C.   Other Single Employer Rules Before 1964
While the NLRB provided ample precedent for a single employer doctrine, the Board’s
use of the doctrine was necessarily limited to collective bargaining law.  If NLRB case law and
the handful of secondary boycott and FELA cases were the only historical precedents, one might
still question whether lawmakers would have expected the doctrine to be part of Title VII.  In
fact, however, the doctrine had migrated into other spheres of employment law well before 1964. 
Two New Deal era laws in particular presented occasions for the further development of the
doctrine.
135Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
136Id. § 907(a), 49 Stat. at 642.
137See Kellogg v. Murphy, 349 Mo. 1165, 164 S.W.2d 285 (1942), quoting the provisions
of what was then Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9432(I).
138Many of the earliest cases are described in Kellogg v. Murphy, 349 Mo. 1165, 164
S.W.2d 285 (1942).  See also Teets v. Leach, 112 Colo. 304, 148 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1944); Karlson
v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 436, 56 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. 1944); Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 506, 56 N.E.2d
832 (Ill. 1944); Huiet v. Dayan, 69 Ga.App. 81, 24 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. App. 1943); State
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Unemployment Compensation Division, Dept. of Treasury
v. Warrior Petroleum, Inc., 221 Ind. 180, 46 N.E.2d 827 (Ind. 1943); State ex rel. Okl.
Employment Sec. Com'n v. Tulsa Flower Exchange, 192 Okla. 293, 135 P.2d 46 (Okla. 1943).
139Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
14052 Stat. 1062, 1063.  See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 130-31, 65 S. Ct.
165, 167, 89 L. Ed. 118 (1944); Walling v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 61 F. Supp. 290, 303
(D. La. 1945) (“the application of the Act depends on the character of the employee’s activities
The first of these New Deal era laws was the Social Security Act of 1935,135 which gave
birth to a federal-state partnership for the funding and administration of the unemployment
compensation system.  The Act funded the system by a payroll tax, but it offered a small firm
exemption for an employer of fewer than eight employees.136 The Act gave no directions for
combining affiliated firms for purposes of counting employees.  By design, however, primary
responsibility for collecting taxes and administering the system fell to the states.  Many of the
legislatures that adopted implementing legislation foresaw the problem: What if a single owner
or group of owners were organized into separate entities with separate payrolls?  The statutory
solution adopted by many states required counting all employees of a group of entities “owned or
controlled by legally enforceable means or otherwise, directly or indirectly, by the same
interests...”137 These statutes provoked substantial litigation during the late nineteen thirties until
the late nineteen forties, with some employers challenging the single employer rule as part of a
broad equal protection attack against the unemployment compensation scheme, and others
questioning whether the single employer proviso implicitly required proof of unified or
interrelated operations.138 Litigation over the single employer proviso subsided as Congress and
the states gradually repealed the small firm exemptions for payroll taxes.
Yet another New Deal era law that eventually led to a variation of the single employer
doctrine was the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.139 As originally enacted, the FLSA lacked an
exemption specifically designed for small firms, but most small firms would have fallen outside
the scope of coverage for any of several reasons.  Coverage actually depended on the character of
an employee’s work, and whether he was personally “engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce.”140 Under this employee-based system of coverage, an employer of any
rather than on the nature of the employer's business”).  As a practical matter, the nature and size
of an employer’s business was very important to the proof of any employee’s involvement in
interstate commerce.  See, e.g., Aetna Finance Co. v. Mitchell, 247 F.2d 190 (1st Cir. 1957)
(describing the interrelationship between the employer’s establishments in different states as a
means of proving that the employees were engaged in interstate commerce).
141See Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 694 (3d Cir. 1994); National Labor
Relations Board v. Dixie Terminal Co., 210 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.  1954) (comparing jurisdiction
under the NLRA with jurisdiction under the FLSA, and concluding that the FLSA’s employee-
based coverage is more limited than the NLRA’s “labor dispute” coverage); Linder, supra note
13, at 417, 423-24.
142Cf. Wells v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 6 F.R.D. 606 (W.D.Ky. 1943) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s “unitary enterprise” theory for regarding construction workers as “engaged in
commerce” based on the prospective business of the factory they were building).
14352 Stat. 1067.
144Id. 
145See Mitchell v. Household Finance Corp., 208 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir.1954) (rejecting theory
that employees were engaged in commerce simply because the corporation that employed them
was part of a larger interstate enterprise); De Loach v. Crowley’s, Inc.,128 F.2d 378 (5th
Cir.1942) (issue whether subsidiary was part of a single enterprise with parent was unimportant
to whether employees who handled goods passing from one to the other were engaged in
interstate commerce).
size might find some of its employees within the coverage of the Act, and some of its employees
outside the coverage of the Act.  Even the smallest of firms might be subject to coverage with
respect to at least one employee.  However, despite the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking
decision in  Jones & Laughlin Steel the year before, it was still widely expected that a great deal
of business activity would not count as “interstate commerce.”141 For example, Congress
evidently assumed that employees of many small firms in the construction and repair industry
would fall outside the reach of the Act.142 Many other small businesses (as well as some very
large ones) could take refuge in an exemption for “any employee engaged in any retail or service
establishment the greater part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce.”143 A
small firm unable to prove this exemption for its employees might still turn to any one of a series
of other specialized exemptions tending to benefit mainly small firms.144 
Initially, therefore, a small firm exemption might have seemed superfluous, and the
omission of a small firm exemption substantially obviated the need for a rule for treating
multiple entities as if they were one.145 An employer’s affiliation with other corporations was
146See, e.g., Beneficial Finance Co. of Wis. v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1965);
Walling v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 61 F. Supp. 290, 303 (D. La. 1945).
147331 U.S. 722, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947).
148331 U.S. at 727-28, 67 S.Ct. at 1475.
149331 U.S. at 727, 67 S.Ct. at 1475, quoting the opinion of the court of appeals, 156 F.2d
523, 516 (10th Cir. 1946).  
150331 U.S. at 729, 67 S.Ct. at 1476.
151Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L.. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (1961).
152Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, S. Rep. 87-145 (Apr. 10, 1961), 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1961, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 1621, 1644-46.  See also Reich v. Gateway
Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1994).
153See Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 694-95, 696 (3d Cir. 1994).
often part of the proof of an employee’s participation in commerce,146 but the same result could
usually be achieved by showing the employer’s relationship with independent out-of-state
customers or suppliers.  A more important early use for a single employer or integrated enterprise
doctrine was to extend liability beyond the nominal employer to its affiliates.  In Rutherford v.
McComb,147 for example, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Labor was entitled to
injunctive relief against one or both of two affiliated corporations with respect to the employment
of boner crews within a slaughterhouse owned by one of the corporations.  The specific issue
before the Court was whether the boner crews were “employees” of either corporation, or
whether the crews were employees of a putative independent contractor. The Court specifically
declined to reach the questions whether both corporations were employers or whether they
constituted a single employer.148 Nevertheless, in stressing that employment relations should be
judged in light of “economic realities,”149 that the boning work was “a part of the integrated unit
of production,” and that the boners were employees of the “establishment,”150 the Court lent
support to the concept of an employer enterprise that transcends formal corporate organization.
A single employer rule for purposes of coverage became especially important with the
1961 amendments,151 which created the justification for a true small firm exemption and the need
for a rule for identifying the entity to be measured. First, Congress repealed the broad exemption
for employees of retail and service establishments, particularly to extend the Act’s reach to
employees of large nationwide retailers but also eliminating the refuge that had protected many
small firms.152 In place of the old exemption, Congress provided a new exemption based on the
revenues of the employer “enterprise.”  The purpose of the new exemption was to sort “mom and
pop” businesses from larger ones.153 Qualification for the exemption, however, depended on
identification of the “enterprise,” which might be greater or less than a single corporation.
154Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L.. 87-30, §2, 75 Stat. 65 (1961), codified at 29 U.S.C.
§203(r).  The definition of “enterprise” goes on to exclude independently owned retail and
service businesses that are part of franchising, distributorship and similar relationships.
155Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 694 (3d Cir. 1994); Cruz v. Chesapeake
Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 229 (3d Cir.1991).
156Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, S. Rep. 87-145 (Apr. 10, 1961), 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1961, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 1660.
157Id. 
The concept of an employer “enterprise” was also the focus of a new alternative basis for
coverage.  After 1961, an employee enjoyed the protection of the law if he was personally
engaged in interstate commerce, or if he was employed in an “enterprise” engaged in commerce. 
Again the concept of an “enterprise” suggested something possibley larger than a single legal
person or entity.  
The amendments defined “enterprise” for both purposes as 
the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by
any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities
whether performed in one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other
organizational units including departments of an establishment operated through leasing
arrangements, but shall not include the related activities performed for such enterprise by
an independent contractor.154 
From this definition, the courts distilled three elements that closely resemble the elements of the
single employer doctrine of collective bargaining law: 1) the entities allegedly constituting a
single enterprise are “engaged in related activities,” 2) they are under “unified operation or
common control;” and 3) they have a common business purpose.”155 
One might ask why Congress was not content on this occasion to adopt, explicitly or
implicitly, the existing single employer doctrine from collective bargaining law.  Evidently, the
drafters sought a rule that was both more far-reaching and more precisely targeted than the
collective bargaining rule.  On the one hand, an enterprise might be a mere division of a
corporation which was engaged in more than one distinct and unrelated business.156 On the other
hand, the statutory definition of “enterprise” permitted aggregation of separate entities based on
“unified operation” in lieu of “common control,”157 and it did not require  proof of common labor
relations.  The result was to extend the reach of the Act to very small corporations, provided they
were part of an integrated “enterprise” that exceeded the statutory threshold.
The development of rules for aggregating separately organized firms under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Social Security Court is one more part of the background that illuminates
Congress’s intent in the small firm exemption of Title VII.  By 1964, it was perfectly normal to
158New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Report on Progress 45 (1948),
described in Michael Tobriner, California FEPC, Hastings L. Rev. 333, 342-33 (1965).
159Tobriner, supra, note 158, at 343.  The interview was dated August 15, 1963.  The
article describing the interview was published in 1965. 
treat multiple affiliated entities as a single employer for purposes of statutory coverage under
employee protective legislation, either according to the federal common law that had evolved
since the beginning of the century, or according to fine-tuned statutory rules.  Most importantly,
Congress’s debate over firm aggregation for FLSA purposes reached its culmination just as
Congress was beginning the debate over a new Civil Rights law, and only three years before the
enactment of Title VII.
D.  Early State Civil Rights Laws and the Single Employer Doctrine
There is one last stage prop for Congress’s debate over Title VII and the small firm
exemption: discrimination law.  Congress did not write Title VII on a blank page.  Many of the
Act’s provisions were modeled after state civil rights laws enacted during the post-War and early
civil rights eras.  The states took a variety of approaches to the omnipresent issues whether small
firms should be exempt, and what number of employees should mark the cutoff.  In some states
there was no small firm exemption at all.  In some others the threshold was so low that there was
little work for a single employer doctrine.  Enforcement was largely administrative in the early
days and was not particularly vigorous.  Southern states passed no civil rights laws at all. 
Nevertheless, at least some state authorities were conscious of the single employer doctrine and
expected to apply the doctrine in an appropriate case.  As early as 1948, the New York State
Commission Against Discrimination took the position that if a single individual owned several
businesses, the employees of all businesses would count in determining the applicability of New
York’s small employer exemption.158 In 1963, the Legal Counsel for California’s Fair
Employment Practices Commission opined in an interview that California would follow New
York’s approach and aggregate affiliated firms.159
Congress was not necessarily aware of these additional pronouncements of the single
employer doctrine in state discrimination law.  There does not appear to have been any reported 
testing the single employer doctrine in state discrimination law before 1964. On the other hand,
the declarations of state civil rights authorities in the years before Title VII evidences the strength
and obviousness of the connection between a small firm exemption and the increasingly routine
practice of treating some affiliated firms as if they were one employer. 
III.  Is the Single Employer Doctrine Consistent 
 With the Terms and History of Title VII?
A.  The Text As Enacted in 1964
160See text accompanying notes 268-271, infra.
161110 Cong. Record S 7073 (April 7, 1964) (Senator Stennis) (emphasis added). Senator
Stennis’ later description of the same problem for one of his constituents appears to be a
repetition of the same story.  110 Cong. Record S 7087 (April 7, 1964) (Senator Stennis).
162U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-62, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 1884, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). 
It is clear enough that persons familiar with labor law in 1964 would have been aware of
the of single employer doctrine and its importance in matters of statutory coverage, especially as
a limit against a small firm exemption. Consider what had happened or was happening by the
time of the1964 Congressional proceedings: (1) the single employer doctrine had developed as an
important and well-known limit on small firm exemptions in federal collective bargaining law,
state unemployment compensation laws, and the Fair Labor Standards Act; (2) as recently as
1961 Congress had debated the best design for a statutory version of the doctrine for the Fair
Labor Standards Act; (3) the viability of the non-statutory version of the single employer doctrine
was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court; and (4) state administrative agencies that had taken
the lead in anti-discrimination law had predicted that the single employer doctrine would limit
local versions of the small firm exemption.
Then there is the record of Congress’s debate. Unfortunately, while Congress vigorously
debated the small firm exemption, its attention was riveted to the question of what number of
employees should be the threshold.160 The question whether the single employer doctrine would
limit the exemption was not a significant part of the public debate.  On the other hand, there is
evidence that Congress expected that the doctrine would apply.  Senator Stennis, an opponent of
the Civil Rights Act, warned that many small businesses might be surprised to learn that they
were included in the coverage of Title VII. To make his point, he recalled that many businesses
were already subject to executive orders requiring nondiscrimination in the performance of
federal contracts, and he related the following:
I received many telephone calls from ... small manufacturing operations in Mississippi
that did not sell the Federal Government $1 worth of their products, but happened to be
owned by a company ... which did do business with the Government. It was insisted that
they submit to certain formulas for which there was not authority, and furthermore there
was no connection with the Federal Government in what was being manufactured, except
a remote affinity with a chain company.161
In the face of this evidence of Congress’s awareness of the problem, one might still argue
that Congress dodged the issue, choosing not to address what might have been a difficult issue
for legislation that was already especially challenging for politicians.  Silence might imply
acquiescence in the doctrine, but there is also an argument to be made for the opposite
conclusion.  If the single employer doctrine is strong, so too is the “bedrock” rule that a
separately organized corporate entity is a separate person.162 If Title VII is silent, as the critics
have assumed, perhaps silence implies adoption of the usual law of corporations, not the law of
employment.
16342 U.S.C. §2000e(a).
164House Judiciary Committee’s Report, No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.(Nov. 20, 1963), in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil
Rights Act of 1964, pp. 2027 (1978).  
However, Congress was not completely silent.  The proper starting point for
understanding the concept of the “employer” in Title VII is not the statutory definition of
“employer.” Rather, one must begin with an examination of the statutory definition of “person,”
which happens to be the very first term in Title VII’s list of definitions.  Title VII’s definition of 
“person” is out of the ordinary:
The term ‘person’ includes one or more individuals, ... labor unions, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock
companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations.”163 
This definition of “person” is striking because it includes the plural form of entities that
ordinarily qualify as persons on an individualized basis.  Two individuals could be a “person,”
which would not be surprising in the case of a partnership except that the definition redundantly
lists “partnerships” (plural) as another type of “person.”  More importantly, “person” includes
“one or more ... corporations.”   A “person” is not necessarily a covered “employer.”  It must
have fifteen employees in the case of Title VII.  But if the person in question consists of more
than one corporation, the sum of these corporations’ workforces evidently would determine
whether the “person” was a covered employer or an exempt small firm.
One might object that Title VII’s definition of “person” is more likely careless drafting
than a purposeful abrogation of the usual laws of incorporation.  After all, if “one or more ...
corporations” could be a single “person,” how are we to know whether any particular set of
corporations constitute that person?  The single employer doctrine likely would have come to
mind to anyone considering the matter carefully and knowingly in 1964.  
Yet there is another confusing signal in the record, and at first glance it might appear to
lead in a different direction.   A House Judiciary Committee report explained as follows:
The terms “person,” “employee,” “commerce,” “industry affecting commerce,” and
“State” are defined ... in the manner common for Federal statutes.164 
This statement seems completely wrong, at least with respect to the definition of “person.”  Title
VII’s definition of “person” is quite uncommon in comparison with “Federal statutes” in general. 
However, the more important message of the Committee report is that the definition of “person”
is borrowed, not written from scratch. And Congress’s choice of models from which to borrow
its definition of “person” is revealing.  If Congress had intended that one corporation would
equal one person under Title VII, it could have borrowed from one of the many “common”
165Compare usual definition of “person” found in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21): “The
term ‘person’ means an individual, firm, corporation....”  In U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 118
S.Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), the Court considered the circumstances under which a
corporation might be held liable as an “operator” of a facility owned by its subsidiary.  The
Court, having specifically cited Section 9601(21), stated, “nothing in CERCLA purports to reject
[the] bedrock principle” that “a parent corporation (so-called because of control through
ownership of another corporation’s stock) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.”  The key
difference between CERCLA’s definition of “person” and Title VII’s definition is that CERCLA 
refers to a corporation in the singular form as a type of person. 
There are also a number of labor laws that define “person” in the usual sense, and some
of these laws predate Title VII and were available  models when Congress enacted Title VII. See,
e,g., the Fair Labor Standards Act, defining “person” to mean “an individual, partnership
association, [or] corporation....”. 29 U.S.C. §203(a).  See also the Anti-Kickback Act, defining
“person” to mean “a corporation, partnership, business association of any kind, trust, joint-stock
company, or individual.”  41 U.S.C. §52.
16629 U.S.C. §152(1) (emphasis added); 41 U.S.C. §41.  The same definition of “person”
may be found in two other pre-Title VII employee relations statutes.  The first was the Walsh
Healey Act of 1936.  See note 89 supra. The second was the Landrum Griffin Act of 1959,  Pub.
L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), which primarily addressed union governance and relations
between a union and its members, but which also amended the National Labor Relations Act.
167See text accompanying notes 88-89, supra.
168See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Hague v. Spencer
Turbine Co., 1982 WL 204 (M.D.N.C., 1982) (unpublished).
statutes that define a “person” as an “individual” or a “corporation” (singular).165 Instead, the
drafters copied language from the Wagner Act.
In language identical in pertinent respects to Title VII, the Wagner provides that 
“person” includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in cases under Title 11,
or receivers.166
As noted earlier, this Wagner Act definition of “person” was the only plausible statutory basis for
the early NLRB decisions invoking the single employer doctrine.167 Indeed, this provision is all
that the NLRB has ever cited in support of the doctrine, beyond its own authority to invent a new
common law of collective bargaining.  Not surprisingly, some of the first courts to invoke the
single employer doctrine in Title VII cases cited the corresponding provision of Title VII.168 
169EEOC Decision No. 71-1677, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1242, 1971 WL 3872
(Apr. 12, 1971); EEOC Decision No. 71-1357, 1 E.P.D. ¶ 6235 (March 3, 1971); EEOC Decision
No. 71-2598, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21, 1970 WL 3560 (June 22, 1970).
170341 F.Supp. 613 (D.C. La.  1972).
171Id. at 433.
172454 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.  1972).
173711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
174Id. at 1336-37. 
A clearer statement by Congress as to the single employer doctrine would have avoided
the current uncertainty among the courts.  It is important to remember, however, that in 1964
experience under the Wagner Act suggested that no clearer statement was necessary.  The NLRB
had established a considerable body of law for the single employer doctrine for an analogous
purpose, with little controversy, and with no greater statutory support than Title VII provided for
the EEOC or the courts.  It would have been reasonable to assume that the EEOC and the courts
would develop a similar body of law suitably tailored to Title VII.  As explained in the next
section, that is exactly what happened during the first twenty years after Title VII.
B.  Developments After 1964
If Congress had failed to state the single employer doctrine any more clearly during the
four decades that followed Title VII, its silence in the face of EEOC and judicial endorsements
would count for something.  In fact, Congress has not been altogether silent.  It has returned to
Title VII on several occasions, substantially amending the Act twice, but never even debating, let
alone overruling, the single employer doctrine.
Admittedly, by the time of Congress’s next close look at discrimination law in 1972,
administrative and judicial applications of the single employer doctrine in Title VII cases were
scant.  The earliest reported applications of the single employer doctrine under Title VII were in
EEOC administrative proceedings, beginning in 1970.169 The first reported judicial application
of the doctrine was not until early 1972, in Williams v. New Orleans S. S. Ass’n.170 Moreover,
the initial response of the courts was not unanimous.  In Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., a district
court rejected the plaintiff’s single employer theory for overcoming a small firm exemption,
seeing “nothing” in Title VII or its history to support the doctrine.171 The Sixth Circuit affirmed
in a terse per curium opinion,172 but reversed course a few years later in Armbruster v. Quinn,173
noting among other things Title VII’s definition of “person” as including “corporations.”174
In short, however, when Congress returned to the subject of the small firm exemption in
1972, the single employer doctrine was only slightly more obvious an issue than it had been in
175See S. 2515 Section 2(b), reproduced at 117 Cong.Rec. 31702 (1972); H.R. 1746, 1st
Sess. 117 Cong. Rec. 212 (1972);  H.R.Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972
U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2137, 2155, 2161.
176Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, § 2(2),
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
177In addition to the cases cited above, see Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397 (5th
Cir.1983); Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982);  Mas Marques v.
Digital Equipment Corp., 637 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing the doctrine, but finding evidence
insufficient to support aggregation of the affiliated corporations); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting
Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.1977); Hague v. The Spencer Turbine Co., 28 FEP Cases 450
(M.D.N.C.1982); Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetics Distributors, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 1070
(D.P.R.1982); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F.Supp. 1256 (N.D.Ohio 1981); Fike v. Gold
Kist, Inc., 514 F.Supp. 722 (N.D.Ala.1981); Copley v. Morality in Media, Inc., 25
Empl.Prac.Dec. ¶ 31,570 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Ratcliffe v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 482 F.Supp.
759 (E.D.Pa.1980); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F.Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.1978), vacated
on other grounds, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir.1979) (ADEA); United States v. Local 638, Enterprise
Association of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Compressed Air, Ice
Machine, Air Conditioning and General Pipefitters, 360 F.Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y.1973), modified,
501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Black Musicians of Pittsburgh v. Local 60-471, American
Federation of Musicians, AFL-CIO, 375 F.Supp. 902 (W.D.Pa.1974).
178See, e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §109,  105 Stat 1071, 
1077 (1991), overruling decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to the rules for disparate
impact discrimination, mixed motive cases, and discrimination by foreign corporations, and also
overruling the Court with respect to meaning of the Reconstruction era civil rights law, 42 U.S.C.
§1981.
1964.  As in 1964, the Congressional debates of 1972 focused on the threshold number and
avoided more difficult questions about the rules for identifying an employer entity.  Proponents
of broader coverage sought to reduce the threshold to eight employees.175 A compromise reduced
the threshold to the current number of fifteen.176 
The balance of judicial authority tipped strongly in favor of the single employer doctrine
over the course of the nineteen-seventies and early eighties.177 In the midst of this period of
widespread judicial acceptance of the doctrine, Congress substantially amended the law again in
1991 to overrule a number of Supreme Court decisions with which Congress disagreed.178 Still,
Congress did nothing to reject the single employer doctrine.
To the contrary, over the same period the single employer doctrine inspired Congress in
its enactment of two  measures extending employer-based coverage.  In 1984, Congress amended
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to overrule court decisions refusing to give that law
179See, e.g., Zahourek v. Arthur Young and Co., 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984).
180Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat 1767 (1984),
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(h).
181Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §109,  105 Stat 1071,  1077 (1991).
182499 U.S. 244, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991).
183Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§2101 - 2109..
184Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§2601 - 2654.
18520 C.F.R. §639.3(a)(2) (for the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act);
29 C.F.R. §825.104(c)(2) (for the Family and Medical Leave Act).
18629 U.S.C. §2611(4)(B) (50 employee threshold); 
187The courts have also held that the doctrine might be used to extend liability to affiliated
corporations and under the WARN Act.  See Pearson v. Component Technology Corp., 247 F.3d
471 (3d Cir. 2001) (but holding that evidence did not support application of the doctrine in that
case).
extraterritorial effect.179 As amended, the ADEA holds an American employer responsible for
actions of a foreign corporation under the American corporation’s “control.”180 Congress’s four-
factor test of  “control” is an unmistakable restatement of the single employer doctrine: “(1)
interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations;
and (4) common ownership or financial control.”   In 1991 Congress amended Title VII in
similar fashion,181 responding to the Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co.182 In Arabian American, the Supreme Court had applied the rule that U.S. law has no
extraterritorial effect in the absence of an express statutory direction, and unlike the ADEA, Title
VII still lacked an express provision in this regard.  Congress’s four-factor restatement of the
single employer doctrine provided the direction, extending Title VII to foreign corporations
through the American employers who owned them.
There is one other set of developments that supports a theory of Congress’s implicit
approval of the single employer doctrine.  The Department of Labor has exercised its authority to
issue regulations under two relatively recent employment laws, the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN),183 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA),184 using the single employer doctrine to resolve problems of coverage under those
laws.185 Both the WARN Act and the FMLA have small firm exemptions,186 albeit with much
higher thresholds than Title VII.  The Department of Labor’s single employer rule is a way of
overcoming these exemptions, just as the doctrine overcomes the small firm exemption under
Title VII.187 The doctrine’s impact on these laws is neither obscure nor easily overlooked.  As of
April, 2005, there were fifty-six judicial decisions listed by Westlaw under the links for the
FMLA regulation, and 100 judicial decisions under the links for the WARN Act regulation.   On
18829 U.S.C. §2101(a)(1).  
18929 U.S.C. §2611(8), incoporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 203(a).
19054 Fed. Reg. 16064 (April 20, 1989).
19158 Fed. Reg.  31812 (June 4, 1993).
the whole, the courts have upheld the Department’s interpretation of these laws, even though
neither law contains an express declaration of the single employer doctrine.   The WARN Act
arguably provides better support for the doctrine, because it defines “employer” as a “business
enterprise” that employs the requisite number of employees.188 The FMLA, however, defines an
employer as a “person” with the requisite number of employees, and it defines a “person” to
include a singular “corporation.”189 The WARN Act single employer regulation is now sixteen
years old190 and the FMLA single employer regulation is thirteen years old.191 Neither regulation
has provoked a discernable reaction in Congress.
IV.  Is the Single Employer Doctrine Consistent 
 With the Purpose of the Small Firm Exemption?
A.  What Purpose Does the Exemption’s Serve?
Despite Congress’s implied endorsement of a single employer rule in principle, the lack
of an express and precise legislative statement leaves the courts substantial leeway for shaping
the contours of the doctrine.  After all, there is nothing in Title VII, as enacted in 1964 or as
subsequently amended, that compels any particular version of the doctrine.  Moreover, the single
employer doctrine might need tailoring to accommodate it to the functions of the small firm
exemption of discrimination law.  Arguably, this is exactly what Judge Posner and some other
judges have done: they have satisfied the purposes of the small firm exemption by limiting the
single employer doctrine to the sorts of cases in which it would be appropriate to “pierce the
corporate veil” or hold a corporation accountable for actions in which it had some actual
involvement.   In contrast, courts that favor a robust form of the single employer doctrine may
have overstated  Title VII’s remedial goals and underestimated the need for the exemption. 
Thus, it is important to inquire about the purposes and merits of the small firm exemption and to
ask what version of the single employer doctrine is most consistent with Congressional intent. 
As noted earlier, Congressmen who supported or acquiesced in the exemption in 1964 and again
in 1972 articulated five different purposes for the exemption.  The following sections examine
these purposes one-by-one in light of the effect of the single employer doctrine.
1.  Relief from Costs of Regulation
a.  The Argument for Relief
192The state courts frequently rely on the same rationale when interpreting the effect of
their own small firm exemptions.  See, e.g., Brown v. Ford, 905 P.2d 223 (Okla.1995).
193166 F.3d at 940.  See also, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d
Cir.1995); Miller v. Maxwell's International Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.1993).  
194See, e.g., 110 Cong. Record S 7073 (April 7, 1964) (Senator Stennis); 110 Cong.
Record S 7074 (April 7, 1964) (Senators Jordan and Long ); 110 Cong. Record S 13076-77 (June
9, 1964) (Senator Ervin); 110 Cong. Record S 13085, 13092 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Cotton).
The argument was repeated during the debates preceding the 1972 amendments.  118
Cong..Rec.  S 2387, 2410 (1972) (statements of Sen. Stennis and Sen. Fannin); 118 Cong.Rec.
2389-90 (1972) (statement of Senator Allen).
195Employment regulations are not the only costs that fall disproportionately on small
firms.  According to a Small Business Research Summary published by the Small Business
Administration, the cost of a variety of government regulations calculated on a per employee
basis is 45 per cent more per employee for very small firms (employing fewer than 20
employees) than for large firms (employing more than 500).  Mark Crain & Thomas Hopkins,
The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms (Sept. 2005), available online at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs264tot.pdf.
The most frequently cited purpose for a small firm exemption is to relieve small firms of
disproportionate regulatory costs.192 Judge Posner, for example, began his opinion in Papa with
the premise that the small firm exemption was to relieve small firms of the “crushing expense of
mastering the intricacies” of discrimination law.193 The record of Congressional proceedings
leading to Title VII confirms that this was an important justification for the exemption.194 The
essence of the argument is that a firm with very few employees lacks the economies of scale
enjoyed by a firm employing a larger workforce.  Costs of learning and implementing the law do
not vary in direct proportion to the number of employees.  For example, the cost of providing
sexual harassment training might be nearly the same whether an employer has ten employees or
fifty.  A small firm might bear nearly the same cost as a large firm, and that cost might be a
tolerable burden for the large firm when calculated on a per employee basis, but for the small
firm the same cost would translate into a much higher cost per employee.195 
Making an exemption dependent on the number of a firm’s employees is consistent with a
goal of avoiding a disproportionate burden for small firms.  If the exemption depended on
revenue instead of workforce size, an employer-lawyer with two associates and a secretary might
fail to qualify for an exemption in a year in which the employer-lawyer won a huge contingency
fee, even though the economies of scale would still be very poor for learning and implementing
discrimination laws for three employees.  In contrast, a new but very substantial business might
be exempt under a revenue-based rule during its first year when it was hiring thousands of
employees if it did not yet have any sales revenues.  Such a firm would escape responsibility for
discrimination in hiring its initial workforce, even though it enjoyed large firm economies of
scale.  Thus, an exemption based on the number of employees makes sense.
196SBA Office of Advocacy , Frequently Asked Questions (October 2005), available
online at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf. See also Crain & Hopkins, supra note 195, at
3, finding that small firms bear a per capita expense of $829 per employee for “workplace
regulations” even with the exemption, while the per capita figure is $873 for firms employing 40
to 499 employees, and $698 for firms employing more than 500.
197Id.  
Is the cost of not discriminating or learning not to discriminate truly significant for a
small firm?  Not discriminating on the basis of race, sex or religion might seem much easier than
paying taxes or complying with many other laws. However, time has proved that discrimination
law is not only complex but also difficult to understand and implement.  It is not enough for the
owner or top managers of a firm to learn the law.  It must also be learned by every supervisor
with authority to take an adverse employment action against any employee, and the firm must
adopt measures to monitor its supervisors to make sure they are not discriminating.  With the
development of sexual harassment law, an employer probably needs to train even non-
supervisory employees and monitor their social interactions at the workplace.  And sexual
harassment law is just one of several very complex rules of anti-discrimination with which
employers must now contend.  One could add disparate impact theory, interactive reasonable
accommodation theory and stereotyping or other subconscious bias theories. The enactment of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and Americans with
Disabilities Act have compounded the complexity of the law.  The ADA, for example, requires
an employer to understand what mental and physical conditions constitute protected
“disabilities,” and to understand what accommodations are “reasonable”–daunting tasks even for
lawyers and judges.  
A few studies have confirmed that small firms are at a significant disadvantage in bearing
these costs.  According to one study, firms with fewer than 20 employees pay about $920 per
employee as a result of “workplace” regulations–which include wage and hour laws,
occupational safety and health laws and a variety of other regulations–while firms employing
more than 500 employees pay only $841.196 Presumably, the cost to small firms and the margin
of the large firm advantage would increase if all small firms, including those employing as few as
15, were suddenly subject to Title VII and the other discrimination laws.   Admittedly, the cost of
other regulations is much greater.   Environmental regulations, for example, are estimated to cost
small firms $3,296 per employee, and large firms only $710 per employee.197 Beyond the cost of
discrimination law compliance, however, is the potentially catastrophic cost of litigation defense
and liability for a single discrimination lawsuit.
The potential regulatory burdens suffered by a small firm are important for several
reasons.  Disproportionate burdens might impair its ability to compete, particularly with larger
firms that enjoy better economies of scale.  Even if  a small firm could survive the burden (as it
frequently does despite many other disproportionate costs), the small firm might be less likely to
hire additional employees, and the resulting loss in employment opportunities could hurt the very
persons the law was designed to help.  Moreover, a small firm owner experiences regulatory
costs quite differently than owners of a large firm.  Many small firms owners operate their
198See Small Business Administration, The Small Business Economy, pp. 9-11 (2005),
available online at  http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sb_econ2005.pdf.
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businesses as a source of self-employment, and not just as an investment.198 On the other hand,
small business owners do not rely on “wages” or salary” like other workers. Frequently, they earn
their sustenance  from the profits of the business, which means that they bear all the risks of
business.  If competitive pressures prevent a small firm from passing disproportionate costs on to
customers, the impact has a direct impact on the owner’s livelihood. 
Moreover, in a very small firm the owner may be a general manager, front line supervisor
and production worker all in one.  He does not specialize in human resources or administrative
services, either by training or actual work, and he probably lacks the resources to employ a
specialist.  The additional work and responsibility imposed by any new regulation is not only a
financial burden, it is also a burden on his personal time and energy.  If an applicant or employee
sues the small firm, the owner/manager will also bear the burden in personal time, energy and
stress in responding to charges, negotiating and preparing for trial.  The time and energy spent in
litigation will diminish his effectiveness as the manager of the business.
If the need for a small firm exemption is so clear, why there are no small firm exemptions
from many other burdensome regulations?  As noted earlier, small firms face particularly high
costs because of environmental regulations.  Moreover, small firms are not exempt from some
expensive employment laws, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act.199 There are
several reasons why a small firm exemption might be inappropriate for these laws. 
First, the decision whether to exempt small firms could reflect a weighing of the costs and
benefits of exemption.  In the case of environmental regulations, for example, even a very small
firm could cause catastrophic damage to the community by pollution or illegal dumping of toxic
waste.  Violation of occupational safety and health laws by a very small employer could cause
death, total and permanent disability, or serious injury.  No matter how great the burden of these
regulations, it might make sense to require small firms to comply with the law even if small firms
can no longer compete at all in particularly hazardous industries.  In contrast, the harm caused by
small firm discrimination  is contained.  An adverse employment decision, while harmful, is not
fatal, and its effects are not likely to reach beyond the size of the employer’s small workforce
unless all small firms discriminate in unison.  In general, the jobs from which minorities might be
wrongfully excluded in small firms tend to be at the bottom rung rather than the top.  Small firms
offer lower pay, fewer benefits, and less job security than larger firms.200 
A second reason why an exemption might be more appropriate for discrimination law
than other for laws is that an employer faces a different set of costs and risks in defending against
discrimination claims.   The issue whether an employer violated a safety or environmental
standard usually depends on objective, physical evidence.  Either the employer provided
201See 42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m).
202Id. 
203See 29 U.S.C. §658.
204See Mark Rothstein and Lance Liebman,  Employment Law. 762-63 (5th ed. 2003). 
205The opportunities for employees to challenge OSHA’s lack of vigor in enforcement are
quite limited.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §657(f) (writ of mandamus procedure for employee who
believes Secretary of Labor has “arbitrarily or capriciously” failed to seek injunctive relief
against an “imminent danger”); and §659(c) (allowing an employee to challenge the time period
protective gear or he did not, and the outcome is not likely to depend on speculation about the
employer’s state of mind.  Discrimination laws, however, provide a plausible basis for argument
in many cases in which the evidence is mainly subjective and circumstantial.  Even if the
employer had a legitimate reason for an adverse action, the employer could still be liable if
prejudice was one of the “motivating factors.”201 The employer may have to prove a speculative
proposition, that it would have taken the same action regardless of the employer’s discriminatory
motive.202 Proving or disproving all the circumstances and motivations for the employer’s
decision can involve many easily disputed facts.  Defending against a discrimination claim is not
only expensive, but frequently uncertain, and the ultimate resolution is frequently in the hands of
a jury.  
The mixed motive doctrine presents another special risk for the owner whose business is
his employment and livelihood.  In a very small business, the owner usually must take personal
responsibility for nearly any significant employment decision.  An allegedly discriminatory past
act or a past unguarded outburst of prejudice could be circumstantial evidence enough to
persuade a fact finder that discrimination was a “motivating factor.”  In larger organization, a
manager with a troubled past might be terminated, assigned to non-supervisory work, or
subjected to careful oversight with respect to employment decisions.  In the case of a very small
business, however, the only sure way for the owner to avoid the risk of a “motivating factor”
charge is to sell or liquidate the business.
Still another reason why small firms may have a special need for exemption from
discrimination laws has to do with the manner in which discrimination laws are enforced. 
Employment laws can be roughly divided into those which provide for private enforcement, and
those which do not.  The OSH Act, which lacks a small firm exemption, is an example of a law
with very little  private enforcement.  It is enforced almost exclusively by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a division of the Department of Labor.203 OSHA
must take care not to antagonize small business interest groups that enjoy considerable influence
in Washington and that have succeeded in limiting OSHA’s powers in the past.204 If OSHA
decides not to pursue a particular matter or theory or to moderate its demands against an
employer, OSHA’s decision is usually the end of the matter.  There is very little opportunity for
private enforcement of the OSH Act’s provisions.205 
allowed for abatement).
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In contrast, all the major discrimination laws permit private enforcement.  Initial
enforcement authority lies in the EEOC, an independent agency.206 Proponents of the small firm
exemption for Title VII worried that small firms would be at a distinct disadvantage in dealing
with what they feared would be a fearsome bureaucracy.207 In actual practice, the EEOC has
been just as important as a facilitator of private enforcement as an instigator of public
enforcement.  The EEOC offers a charging party a means of preliminary investigation of the
possibility of unlawful discrimination at no cost to the employee.  However, regardless of
whether the EEOC finds “reasonable cause” to believe the employer unlawfully discriminated,208
the individual employee decides for himself whether to sue, what theories to pursue, what
remedies to seek, and whether to settle for any particular terms.209 Even if the employee is
unable to find an attorney willing to accept his case, Title VII provides that “the court may
appoint an attorney” for the employee and “authorize the commencement of the action without
the payment of fees, costs, or security.”210 If the employee prevails, the employer will pay his
attorneys fees.211 If an employee’s claim has no merit, the claim might still have enough
“nuisance” value to fortify the employee’s demand for some settlement price.  These
opportunities for private enforcement may be necessary to level the playing field between a very
large firm and an individual employee.  If the employer were a very small firm, however, Title
VII’s private enforcement procedures might seem to turn the individual employee into a Goliath.
Finally, liability for employment discrimination is different from many other business
liabilities because of the difficulty of insuring against such liability.  A simple intentional
discrimination lawsuit is excluded from coverage under a commercial general liability (CGL)
policy precisely because it is “intentional” and because it does not involve the sort of bodily
injury liabilities typically covered by a CGL policy.212 For many years after Title VII 
discrimination liability was essentially an uninsurable risk.  Recently, the insurance industry has
begun to develop a market for employment practices liability insurance (EPLI).213 This new form
Liability: Does Employment Practices Liability Insurance Offer Appropriate Risk Transference?
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[T]he small businessmen should be covered as well as the large businessman–as he is in a
whole string of other laws across the board.  Do we think that if he we leave him out of
this provision, we will save him from litigation with the Department of Justice, the SEC,
or the other departments?  Of course not.
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of insurance does not necessarily close the gap between very small firms and larger firms insofar
as their ability to absorb the costs of liability under employment discrimination laws.  Small
firms are likely to experience the usual disadvantages in purchasing insurance at competitive
rates, and it is questionable whether EPL insurers will choose to sell policies to firms so small
that they cannot afford professional human resources or other expensive risk avoidance
measures.214
The argument that an exemption is necessary to spare small firms from a disproportionate
financial burden is undercut to some extent by the fact that small firms are still subject to liability
for discrimination under other laws.215 Section 1981216 prohibits race discrimination without any
exemption for small firms; executive orders require “affirmative action” by federal contractors
regardless of the number of employees;217 and many state discrimination laws lack exemptions or
provide much more limited exemptions.218 However, none of these laws appeared likely to
overburden small firms in 1964, and even today they are of little consequence in comparison with
Title VII.  In 1964 the Supreme Court had not yet rendered the broad interpretation of Section
1981 that made that statute an alternative basis for an employment discrimination claim against a
219See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189
(1968) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 does not require proof of state action).
220For example, Section 981 prohibits only intentional race discrimination and possibly
national origin discrimination.  See St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S.Ct.
2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987).  It does not prohibit discrimination on any other basis, and it does
not prohibit disparate impact race discrimination. General Building Contractors Association, Inc.
v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982). 
221There is no private enforcement of employee rights under the executive orders.  Rogers
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1083 (5th Cir. 1980).  If a contractor violates its obligations, it
might be disbarred from doing business with the federal government, but the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs is likely to use this the threat of this sanction mainly as leverage
to encourage reform.
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discharge cause of action based on discrimination.  Compare Roberts v. Dudley,  140 Wash. 2d
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224Wisconsin law, for example, has no small firm exemption.  A person could be an
employer by virtue of employment of a single employee.  Wis. Stat. ch. 111.32(6)(a).  However,
Wisconsin’s law provides for administrative dispute resolution with limited financial liability for
the employer.  Wis. Stat. ch. 111.39.
private sector employer.219 Today Section 1981 prohibits a very narrow range of discrimination
in comparison with Title VII,220 and it lacks the employee-friendly charge processing and
investigatory scheme of Title VII.  The executive orders for affirmative action are much less
intimidating than Title VII in terms of complexity or potential liability,221 and can be avoided
altogether by not doing business with the federal government.  As for the states, many did not
prohibit discrimination in 1964.222 Today nearly every state prohibits discrimination, but usually
with a small firm exemption modeled after Title VII.223 State laws that lack an exemption are
sometimes  accompanied by administrative dispute resolution and limited liability for
employers.224
There is one more fact–a development since 1964–that might undercut the need for
regulatory relief for small firms today.   Since 1964, the staffing service industry has developed a
number of models for providing professional human resources services for small businesses. One
225Steven P. Berchem, American Staffing Association’s Annual Economic Analysis of the
Staffing Industry (2005), online at www.americanstaffing.net/statistics/economic2005.cfm
226Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements
(July 27, 2005), online at ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/conemp.txt.
227For a discussion of the facts and issues in Papa, see text accompanying notes 49-71,
supra.
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model involves the transfer of some or all the small business’s employees to the staffing service’s
payroll, making the staffing service the nominal “employer” of the employees.  The contract
employer (the workers’ original employer) then “leases” the employees from the staffing service,
to do exactly the same work as before.  The leasing of employees can make it easier to secure
insurance and benefits for the employees, and it can also be one way of providing professional
human resources management for the workforce, provided such services are part of the
arrangement.  Whether such services are equally available to or practical for a small firm as for a
large firm, and whether they significantly reduce or eliminate a small firm’s problems in
matching a larger firm’s economies of scale is unclear.   A survey by the American Staffing
Association shows that small firms are less likely than larger firms to rely on staffing services. 
While 24 percent of firms employing more than 100 employees engaged staffing services, only
12 percent of firms employing 25 to 99 employees engaged staffing services.225 Most firms that
engaged staffing services did so to obtain “temporary” help, to provide temporary substitution for
regular employees on leave, or to perform special short term projects.   As of 2005, employee
leasing or other “contract” worker arrangements appear to have reached a very limited number of
firms and workers.226 In sum, it does not appear that staffing services have been a significant
factor in closing the gap between large and small firms.
b.  Is the Single Employer Doctrine Consistent
 With the Goal of Regulatory Relief for Small Firms?
In Papa, Judge Posner argued that the single employer doctrine is inconsistent with the
small firm exemption’s purpose of protecting small firms from the disproportionate burden of
regulation.227 He began his argument with a premise that the regulatory relief purpose of the
exemption is unrelated to the wealth of a firm’s owner:   “If a firm is too small to be able
economically to cope with the antidiscrimination laws, the owner will not keep it afloat merely
because he is rich; rich people aren’t famous for wanting to throw good money after bad.”228
Next, he argued that intercorporate ownership and integration of operations, management, or
personnel relation are no more relevant to the small firm exemption than the wealth of the
owner.229 Intercorporate integration, standing alone, reveals nothing about a firm’s need for an
exemption, according to Judge Posner,  because it is a perfectly normal way of doing business, as
230Id. (emphasis added).
much for very small firms as for larger ones.  A small firm must integrate at least some functions
with other firms by some means in order to achieve economies of scale necessary to compete,
particularly against larger firms.  When a small firm integrates by affiliating with another firm,
such as by one firm’s acquisition of another, it is simply adopting one of at least two different
strategies for integration.  The small firm could also integrate by making a contract for certain
services with an independently owned firm that performs the same service for many other firms.  
Indeed, a small firm can achieve economies of scale by either means of integration—
affiliation or contract—for nearly any business function.  Consider, for example, the integration
of personnel management (including payroll and benefits administration).  If the firm owns, is
owned by, or shares a common owner with another firm, the combined enterprise can employ one
full time payroll and benefits administrator to service both firms, splitting the cost between the
firms.  Alternatively, the small firm could contract with an unaffiliated payroll and benefits
servicing agency that serves many different firms, at a fraction of the cost of hiring staff to
provide the same services in-house.
In Judge Posner’s view, the single employer doctrine ascribes undue importance to a
firm’s choice of methods for integration.  Under most applications of the doctrine in
discrimination law,  common ownership or some other means of common financial control is a
prerequisite for treating two firms as one employer.  Naturally, commonly owned firms are more
likely to integrate administration and operations with their affiliates, rather than by contracting. 
However, Judge Posner argued that a small firm’s integration by one means rather than the other
has little or no bearing on its need for regulatory relief.  “Why should it make a difference,” he
queried, “if the integration takes the [contract] form instead of common ownership, so that the
tiny employer gets his pension plan, his legal and financial advice, and his payroll function from
his parent corporation without contractual formalities, rather than from independent
contractors?”230 Finding no reason, Judge Posner concluded that the means of integration should
make no difference at all.  In his view, the fact that the employer subsidiaries in Papa merged
payroll administration and benefits plans with their parents and affiliated subsidiaries was simply
irrelevant to whether they qualified as small firms exempt from the reach of employment
discrimination laws. 
The difficulty with this reasoning is that if it were categorically true, the small firm
exemption would serve no practical function at all, except to create an arbitrary and irrational
distinction between small corporations on the one hand, and small divisions of corporations on
the other.  To restate Judge Posner’s query, why should it make a difference if firms integrated by
affiliation or contracting remain separately incorporated, rather than merging?  If it is true that
contracting or integration achieve the same economies of scale, then an enterprise is in the same
boat whether it is independently owned, separately incorporated but affiliated, or an
unincorporated part of a larger corporation.   And this would mean that Congress’s belief that
small firms need relief is simply wrong.  Congress should have followed the lead of those states
that deny preferential treatment to small firms.
231See generally John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L.
Rev. 445, 446, 450-51 (2004).
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Judge Posner’s argument that the means of integration of personnel administration is not
a meaningful basis for distinction is best directed at one arguable overuse of the single employer
doctrine: piercing the corporate veil for purposes of holding a corporation liable for the actions of
a separately incorporated affiliate.  It is, of course, widely accepted that good faith incorporation
is a legitimate means of limiting an owner’s liability.  The rule limiting liability promotes
investment as much for small firms as for large ones.231 Since integration by one means or
another is normal for any business, the mere fact that integration occurs between a parent
corporation and its subsidiary is not, standing alone, a persuasive reason to pierce the corporate
veil, and there does not appear to be any reason why liability for discrimination should be
anymore penetrating than liability for any other reason.  In Papa, however, the precise issue on
appeal was whether the affiliates should be treated as one “employer” for purposes of coverage.
True, the EEOC has adopted the NLRB’s view that application of the single employer doctrine is
the equivalent of piercing the corporate veil for purposes of liability,232 but piercing the corporate
veil raises entirely different issues from the problem of coverage.  A finding that a small
subsidiary should not be treated as an exempt small firm would not would not lead ineluctably to
a finding that the entire corporate family was jointly liable.  Still, the arguments of critics like
Judge Posner might best be understood as an anticipatory response to the possibility that
plaintiffs, having obtained coverage over a subsidiary, will then hold the parent financially liable.
The real issue for cases like Papa, however, is whether separately incorporated entities
that are closely affiliated and integrated with larger enterprises should be granted the same
exemption allowed to truly small and independent firms.  In this regard, there are important
limits to Judge Posner’s argument.  First, independent firms might not be able to gain the same
efficiencies of scale by contract that affiliated firms gain by integration. As noted earlier, the staff
services industry provides personnel administration on a contract basis for many firms, but very
small firms do not seem to have used these services as effectively as larger firms.233 Since very
small firms tend to be the least stable and pay the lowest wages and the least benefits, it is
doubtful that they are attractive clients for the staffing services industry.  If so, a firm that
affiliates and integrates with a larger enterprise is at a comparative advantage, whether the
enterprise provides personnel services internally or contracts for such services on behalf of all its
subsidiaries.  
Second, the economies of scale that contracting might provide for ongoing personnel
functions such as payroll and benefits administration might not apply to the regulatory costs of
discrimination law.  Some of the principal costs of discrimination law are training and review of
supervisors, developing an ongoing awareness of the law, and promoting a culture of
nondiscrimination.   If the firm is a subsidiary within a larger enterprise, it can combine training
234See text accompanying notes 201-211, supra.
235See text accompanying notes 212-14, supra. 
236For a discussion of personality traits of the self-employed, including their greater
emphasis on independence, see Sjoerd Beugelsdijk & Niels Noorderhaven, Personality
Characteristics of Self-Employed: An Empirical Study, 24 Small Business Economics 159
(2005).
237A test based on the number of employees does not precisely match the rhetoric, but it is
hard to imagine a more effective definition of “small” for this purpose.  As noted earlier, the only
other simple and widely accepted means of measuring firm size is by revenue, but this method
of managers from all affiliated organization to achieve economies of scale that cannot be
obtained by the independent firm’s contracting with outside providers.  Moreover, an integrated
enterprise enjoys the advantage of informal sharing of information and the culture of diversity
among affiliated managers, particularly when there is overlapping management, in ways that
cannot be achieved by contracting.  Other potential costs of discrimination law are defense and
liability.  As noted earlier, these costs might actually be the most important disproportionate
burdens small firms would face if not for the small firm exemption,234 but small firms might not
be able to insure against these costs.235
Third, Judge Posner was replying mainly to one part of the single employer test, the
integration of labor management, which he deemed irrelevant.   His attention to this particular
factor is not surprising, because the EEOC and the courts have tended to assign particular
importance to this factor.  However, Judge Posner may be correct that the importance of
integrated labor management is overplayed in discrimination cases.  The NLRB has emphasized
integrated labor management as a factor in bargaining unit cases, and in discretionary jurisdiction
cases in which the ultimate question is the effect of a labor dispute on commerce.  In
discrimination law, however, the question is how to aim the small firm exemption at firms that
operate at such a disadvantage in general that they may need relief from government regulation.  
Even if independent small firms are able to contract for personnel services that affiliated firms
gain by integration, there are still many reasons why independent firms might be at a
disadvantage.   Small independent firms might not be able to gain competitive economies of
scale with respect to the integration of other services and operations beyond personnel
administration.  Moreover, small firms often  remain independent even when profits are
relatively low because the owner seeks and perhaps needs the independence and security of self-
employment.236 
Finally, Judge Posner’s initial premise, that the character of the business owner (wealthy
or not wealthy) is irrelevant, may be a bit off the mark.  At least as a matter of rhetoric,
Congress’s debates about the small firm were particularly about the individual whose business is
his self-employment or the employment for his family.  The image of a self-employed business
owner seems clear enough from the tenor of the Congressional debates about the burden of
regulation on the small business owner.237 It becomes even clearer in the next section about one
has its own problems and might defeat the purpose of discrimination law in some important
respects.  See text accompanying note 195, supra.  One could also envision a test based on the
number of a firm’s individual owners to distinguish “investment” from self-employment, but
such a test would then have to account for the fact that families sometimes act like individuals,
depending on lines of authority and loyalty within the particular family.
238The idea of zone of freedom to discriminate in “personal” relations within very small
firms was also a purpose of some of the state laws that preceded Title VII.  See Jennings v.
Marralle, 8 Cal.4th 121, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 (1994); Tobriner, supra note 158, at 342 (describing
the purposes of California’s exemption for firms employing fewer than five employees). 
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of Congress’s other purposes: To protect truly “personal” relationships.  
2.  A Right of “Personal” Relationships
A second goal articulated by Congressional proponents of the small firm exemption was
to secure a limited sphere for a right of personal relationships free from government
interference.238 Even the boldest proposals for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include
regulation of intimate relations, such as marriage, family, friendship and purely social relations.  
There was intense conflict, however, at several points along the uncertain border between
“business” and “personal.”   Provisions of the Act directed at public accommodations, for
example, provoked the “Mrs. Murphy” debate: If “Mrs. Murphy” sought to make a little money
by offering the extra room in her home to a boarder, should the government tell her whom she
must invite?239 
The business versus personal argument extended to Title VII of the Act.  There was
evidently no dispute that some working relationships such as partnership were personal even if
they were for a business purpose, and that these relationships must remain outside the reach of
the law.  However, advocates of the small firm exemption argued that some employer-employee
relations were also personal, and that the law should protect the most personal employment
relations by distinguishing between large, bureaucratic workplaces and small, intimate ones. 
Within a small firm, the argument ran, relations between owners, managers and their employees
were like partnerships or other personal associations. These relations were not a proper subject of
government regulation.240 “[W]hen a small businessman ... selects an employee,” Senator Cotton
reasoned,” he comes very close to selecting a partner; and when [he] selects a partner, he comes
dangerously close to the situation he faces when he selects a wife.”241 Senator Cotton conceded
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that discrimination within the small firm was no less immoral than within the large firm.242 
Nevertheless, he relied partly on the “personal relations” argument in the course of proposing an
unsuccessful amendment to raise the threshold for employer coverage to 100 employees.243 
Proponents of broader coverage conceded that relations in the very small workplace
might indeed be so personal as to warrant immunity from the law, but they disagreed that the
threshold should be any higher. Senator Humphrey, one of the Act’s leading advocates, argued
that if an employer’s workforce reached 25 employees, it would “lose most of whatever intimate,
personal character they might have had.”244 He believed that personal relations would be
adequately protected by a threshold of  5 or even fewer employees.245 In the end, he agreed to the
25 employee threshold not because a workplace of such size warranted protection for personal
relations, but because“We must admit that in terms of appropriation and enforcement there are
limits” to the scope of employer coverage.246
Of course, there is no particular workplace population at which relations cease to be
“personal” and become “impersonal.” Relations in very large workplaces can be very intimate
between some pairs or groups of individuals, and relations between an individual owner/manager
and his sole employee can be distant and cold.  Assuming that a headcount of employees is still
the best test of potentially personal workplace relations, should personal relations be free from
the prohibition against discrimination?  Most of the reported Congressional commentary on the
issue proceeded from an assumption that it is self-evident that the law should not interfere in
personal relations, if only it were possible to draft a law to make the appropriate distinctions.  But
advocates for immunity for personal relations in 1964 frequently made the argument
apologetically–they did not mean to suggest that discrimination in employment is ever moral–and
over the years the personal relations justification has seemed to fade from memory.  Many
critiques of the small firm exemption omit any mention of the personal relations argument, as if
it was never sincerely or persuasively advanced.
Still, there are reasons to be more protective of personal relations within a small firm than
within a large firm.  Title VII affects personal relations within the firm in two different ways. 
First, the enforcement process and remedies that go along with Title VII and other discrimination
laws can be disruptive of personal relations within the firm, and more so in small firms than in
large ones.  When a disappointed applicant or employee charges or sues a small firm for
employment discrimination, the resulting litigation can have consequences beyond the cost of
247See generally, Note, Title VII Remedies: Reinstatement and the Innocent Incumbent
Employee, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1441  (1989).  An order for the employment or reinstatement of a
prevailing  plaintiff does not require the employer to discharge the employer’s preferred
candidate, but it is unlikely, especially in a small firm, that the employer can continue to employ
both individuals.  
248Retaliation cases constitute more than a third of the suits failed by the EEOC against
employers.  EEOC, FY 2005 Annual Report on the Operations and Accomplishments of the
Office of the General Counsel, pt. III. C and D, available online at
www.eeoc.gov/litigation/05annrpt/index.html.
249Several state courts have interpreted their own laws, modeled after Title VII and the
small firm exemption, to preempt a public policy-based common law prohibition against
discrimination. See notes 10,  223, supra.
defense or financial liability.  Until the claim is resolved, the right to at least one job is uncertain. 
If the claimant prevails on the issue of discrimination, he or she might seek reinstatement at the
expense of the “innocent incumbent” employee.247 If a firm employing 20 is sued for
discrimination in hiring, the litigation affects at least 5 percent of its workforce.  The smaller the
firm, the larger the impact.  If a current employee files an administrative charge with the EEOC
while remaining employed, relations between the employee and the accused owner/manager are
likely to be frosty–as evidenced by the large number of “retaliation” charges that follow
discrimination charges.248 For a large firm, the effect of difficult relations on productivity can be
diluted by the size of the workforce or by transfers.  For a small firm, the tension between one
employee and the owner/manager could become an overwhelming distraction.
A second and more direct way that discrimination law affects personal relations within
the small firm is by prohibiting the owner/manager’s prejudices for particular types of
employees, particularly prejudices that are illegal under the law.  It may seem preposterous that
the exemption was designed to permit small firms the very evil the law was designed to
eradicate.249 Even supporters of the exemption in 1964 stopped short of an explicit defense of
discrimination by small firms.  Nevertheless, the effect of the exemption is to permit small firms
to discriminate, unless they are subject to state or local anti-discrimination laws.  Thus, for better
or worse, the small firm exemption serves as a refuge for the incurably color-conscious.  
In fact, it should neither be surprising nor very troubling if owner/managers of very small
firms are allowed to be affected by conscious or subconscious biases or engage in the sort of
discrimination that is illegal when practiced by larger firms.  Self-employment and ownership of
small business provides employment and opportunity for many persons who find it difficult to
work for others or to conform to rules established by others.  Self-employment may also be the
best outlet for persons who cannot conform or who are unwilling to conform to some of the rules
of discrimination law. Moreover, if a small firm owner’s biases are susceptible to proof because
of past incidents or allegations, he may be unemployable as a manager or supervisor in a
nonexempt firm, because his record of possible bias would be evidence of discrimination in any
challenged employment decision in which he was involved.  If self-employment is the most
250 Restatement (Second) of Torts §46 cmt. d (1965).
251Small Business Administration, The Small Business Economy, pp. 60-61, 87-88
(2005), available online at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sb_econ2005.pdf..
productive option for such individuals, a license to discriminate in the selection of a small
number of employees may be a necessary corollary.   
Granting such a license is not a trivial matter.  As noted at the outset, small firms employ
millions of workers, and the impact of their discrimination could be significant, particularly in
small towns and labor markets where small firms predominate.  Fortunately, there are some
limits on this impact.  The very worst forms of discrimination, such as rank sexual or racial
harassment, are still subject to tort law.  A small business owner whose harassment of an
employee is “outrageous” might be exempt from an EEOC charge but could still find himself
liable for the tort of outrage250 and possibly for assault or battery.  Moreover, the impact of the
small firm license to discriminate may be diminished by the fact that not all small business
owners feel the same biases. To some extent, their biases will be opposite and offsetting. 
Minority firms, for example, tend to employ a disproportionately large number of minority
workers.251 In fact, the idea that discrimination by small firms could actually benefit minorities
was a third argument advanced by promoters of the small firm exemption in 1964, and this idea
is explored in greater detail in the next section of this article. 
If protection of personal relationships is a purposes of the small firm exemption, then the
single employer doctrine is consistent with that purpose.  A small  firm owned by an individual
or family more nearly matches Congress’s intent than a firm that is affiliated with, and perhaps
completely owned by a larger enterprise, particularly if the small firm’s separate incorporation is
for business reasons unrelated to personal relationships within its workforce.   When the firm is
part of a larger family of corporations, its existence is unlikely to be tied to a particular
individual, and affiliation with the larger enterprise provides more options for dealing with a
dispute over the right to a particular job or the tension resulting from a discrimination charge. 
For example, centralization of power within an enterprise allows for the possibility of
intercorporate reassignments and transfers.
3.  Racial and Ethnic Self-Help: Discrimination by Minority Owned Small Firms
Senator Cotton, a defender of the small firm exemption and proponent for an even wider
exemption, explained a third reason for the small firm exemption:  
If I were a Negro, and by dint of education, training, and hard work I had amassed enough
property as a Negro so that I had a business of my own, ... [if] I wanted to help people of
may own race to step up as I had stepped up, I think I should have the right to do so.... I
do not believe that anyone in Washington should be permitted to come in and say, “You
cannot employee all Negroes.  You must have some Poles.  You must have some
252110 Cong. Record S 13086 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Cotton).  See also 110 Cong.
Record S 13086 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Curtis).  Senator Fannin raised a similar argument
during the debate preceding the 1972 amendments.  118 Cong..Rec.  S 2409-10 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Fannin). See also 118 Cong.Rec. 3171  (1972) (statement of Senator Ervin).
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Yankees.”252
It is tempting to dismiss Senator Cotton’s plea for ethnic or racial self-help as
disingenuous.  The right of small business owners to promote their own race did little for the
African-American community before Title VII because discrimination, including a great deal of
self-help by non-minority businesses, had severely limited minority entrepreneurship.  Perhaps
Senator Cotton envisioned a day when laws against discrimination would permit minority
entrepreneurship to flourish, and a small firm exemption would serve as a kind of self-
affirmative action for the first wave of minority entrepreneurs to spread the seeds of their success
within their own communities.  However, even today African-Americans as a class lag behind
White Americans in self-employment or small firm ownership.253 Minority owned small firms
do tend to hire more employees of the same minority,254 but “lawful” discrimination is not
necessarily the reason.  Minority owned businesses might hire more minorities simply because
they are located in racial or ethnic enclaves. 
The best support for the racial or ethnic self-help argument comes from the experience of
some immigrant communities, where small businesses have created employment opportunities
and provided a community-wide economic lift.255 Some measure of immigrant success might
depend on intentional discrimination.  For example, a family of immigrants might prefer to hire
its own members, relatives or friends to work in the restaurant, shop or motel it owns.  The
family might also share resources and information with or grant preferences to other businesses
within a network of families of the same ethnicity.256 Such favoritism could be illegal “national
origin” or “race” discrimination by a covered employer,257 but the small firm exemption protects
the small family-owned business from the duties of nondiscrimination.  Over time, the business
might become more successful and graduate to the rank of “covered” employer.
The single employer doctrine is entirely consistent with a legislative intention to permit
minority self-help within very small firms.  The effect of the doctrine is to limit the right self-
258See, e.g., 110 Cong. Record S 13091 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Cotton).
259Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI
of Civil Rights Act of 1964, pp. 1-3 (1978).
260110 Cong. Record S 13086 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Cotton). 
261110 Cong. Record S 13085 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Cotton). See also Griffin v. Eller,
130 Wash.2d 58, 66-69, 922 P.2d 788, 791-92 (1996).
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help to the sorts of individually or family owned firms that the proponents of the exemption
appear to have had in mind.  Even the strongest proponents of the exemption and self-help do not
appear to have intended to permit minority self-help by firms closely affiliated with larger
enterprises and not necessarily associated with a particular individual or family.  Otherwise, a
very large enterprise composed of many separately incorporated restaurants, motels, retail
establishments or other small-scale establishments might continue to engage in lawful
discrimination that might eventually defeat Title VII’s goal of racial and ethnic integration.
4.  Avoiding Over-Extension of the EEOC’s Resources
A fourth argument for the small firm exemption was that the the EEOC’s projected
budget would not support an unlimited jurisdiction over all employers.258 Questions about the
likely size and budget for an EEOC and its capacity to tackle the formidable problem of
employment discrimination were frequent topics in the Congressional debate.  Past experience
was sobering.  Lack of administrative resources had undermined efforts to enforce executive
orders against discrimination by federal contractors.259 Senator Cotton warned that if Title VII
applied to all employers, large and small, it would require a “small army” for enforcement.260 
Fiscal support for an “army” of federal bureaucrats was unlikely, and a smaller number of
bureaucrats would be overwhelmed by their task.  “If it became necessary ... to investigate every
complaint ...,” Senator Cotton argued, “enforcement would become well neigh impossible; and
enforcement which did occur would be found to be spotty.”261 The solution was to approve an
agency of limited size and mandate to target cases yielding the greatest impact and the greatest
number of employment opportunities for minorities.
The small firm exemption was not really necessary for this strategy.  Congress might have
let the EEOC follow the example of the NLRB, which had adopted self-tailored jurisdictional
limits to better manage its administrative resources.262 The extent of the small firm exemption,
or perhaps a series of exemptions tailored to particular businesses, might then have evolved
according to the EEOC’s actual experience and resources.  But whether or not a statutory
limitation of coverage was necessary, the leading supporters of Title VII used the small firm
exemption to assure Congress that the law would not require a bureaucratic behemoth, that the
agency’s projected budget was sufficient, and that the EEOC would spend its efforts
263110 Cong. Record S 13081 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Clark)
264110 Cong. Record S 13089 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Humphrey). See also 110 Cong.
Record S 13087 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Dirksen).
265110 Cong. Record S 13088 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Humphrey). Relying on employer
registrations with the Social Security Administration, Senator Humphrey counted 3 million
employers above the threshold for coverage.  He believed these 3 million constituted 8 percent of
all employers, and that they employed 40 percent of all employees.  Id.  
266Opponents of Title VII were of two minds about the exemption.  While most opponents
of Title VII appear to have supported the exemption as a way of diluting a law that might be
inevitable, some appeared to oppose the exemption as a kind of dare, arguing that anything less
than complete coverage was  morally inconsistent.  Senator Stennis of Mississippi argued during
the 1972 debate, “If a principle is involved here, if it is a right these employees have, why exempt
those who employ less than eight? . . . If someone has only two employees, if a principle is
involved, this bill ought to cover it.” 118 Cong. Rec. S 2490 (1972).
efficiently.263 Senator Humphrey, who had favored a much smaller exemption, explained his
agreement to the twenty-five employee threshold as the product of a realistic appraisal of
resources available for enforcement.264 A small firm exemption for employers with fewer than
twenty-five employees became one basis for his estimates of the EEOC’s responsibilities and
needs.265
The single employer doctrine expands coverage and thus increases the number of cases
the EEOC must process, but the EEOC endorses the single employer doctrine as part of the rules
of coverage.  That might be answer enough to the question whether the doctrine is consistent
with conservation of the EEOC’s resources.   The four-factor version of the doctrine recited in
the EEOC’s regulations is sufficiently vague to permit the EEOC a fair amount of latitude for
applying the doctrine according to the demands on agency resources. Moreover, the enforcement
process that has evolved since 1964 depends more on private enforcement than the drafters of
Title VII might have foreseen.  If the EEOC is stymied, individual plaintiffs are still free to
pursue enforcement by a private lawsuit.  
5.  The Small Firm Exemption as a Political Compromise
A realistic appraisal of the original legislative purpose of the small employer exemption 
deserves the usual caveat for politics.  Many of the Congressmen who worried for small firms or
who favored a wider small firm exemption represented the Old South and segregation.  They
were not seeking to make the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a better law.  They were hoping to defeat
it.266 The record of Congressional debate over the exemption is unusually rich because the Act’s
opponents  filibustered and filled the record with many arguments designed as much to fill time
267See 110 Cong. Rec. S 7069-7092 (April 7, 1964).  See also 110 Cong. Record S 7202-
7203 (April 8, 1964) (Senator Clark’s description of the filibuster).  Filibusters had defeated
earlier attempts at civil rights legislation.  On this occasion, the Senate did not approve the final
version of the Civil Rights Act, including Title VII, until after 534 hours of debate.  Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights
Act of 1964, pp. 8,11 (1978).
268See 110 Cong. Record S 6549 (March 30, 1964) (Senator Humphrey); 110 Cong.
Record S 6563 (March 30, 1964) (Senator Kuchel); 110 Cong. Record S 7218 (April 8, 1964)
(Senator Clark); 110 Cong. Record S 13081 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Clark); 110 Cong. Record S
13083 (June 9, 1964); 110 Cong. Record S 13087 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Dirksen);(Senator
Javitts); 110 Cong. Record S 13090- 13091 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Humphrey). 
269See Note, The Failure of the Integrated Enterprise Test: Why Courts Need to Find
NewAnswers to the Multiple-Employer Puzzle in Federal Discrimination Cases, 75 Ind. L.J.
1041, 1056 (2000), describing the different thresholds states had adopted for coverage under their
civil rights laws. 
Proponents for wider Title VII coverage sought to reduce the threshold from twenty-five
to eight employees in 1972.  See 118 Cong..Rec. 2390-2409 (1972); H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 (June
2, 1971) 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1972, 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137.  However,
they settled on a reduction to fifteen, which remains the current threshold.  Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, §2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), codified at 42 U.S.C.
§2000e(b). 
270See, e,g., 110 Cong. Record S 13092 (June 9, 1964) (Senator Cotton) (warning of
political backlash if small businesses were subject to the law).
271In 1963, four years after California adopted its Fair Employment Practices Act, the
Counsel for the California Fair Employment Commission summarized the purposes of
California’s small firm exemption.  One reason he listed was to avoid “political repercussions” if
individuals were not allowed “to retain some small measure of the so-called freedom to
as to win votes.267 On the other hand, the Act’s supporters were not insensitive to the arguments
listed above, and they did not oppose a small firm exemption in principle.  They simply resisted
an exemption any wider then necessary to gain the Act’s passage.268 
Politics best explains the decision to set the threshold for coverage at any particular level. 
Only the explanation of the exemption as a device to match the EEOC’s mandate with its means
arguably points decisively to a threshold of twenty-five employees in 1964 or fifteen in 1972,
rather than any of the other thresholds proposed in Congress or adopted in various state civil
rights laws.269 Still, there is little in the record to suggest a studied effort to arrive at precisely the
right threshold, other than to find the threshold leaving enough small business owners outside the
Act’s coverage to make the new law palatable.270 In this regard, Congress was simply following
a road to compromise already successfully charted by several state legislatures.271 Senator
discriminate.”  A second was that the “framers” of the California law believed “they could afford
to exempt the small employer” in order to obtain a law targeting the most important employers. 
Tobriner, note 158 supra, at 342 (1965). 
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Javitts defended the 25 employee threshold as part of a web of compromises that marked “the
very thin edge of agreement.”272 Senator Dirksen made the same argument in opposition to
efforts to raise the threshold higher.273
The single employer doctrine is more consistent with this compromise than a rule of
coverage without the doctrine.  The rhetoric of the Congressional debate presented the exemption
as protection for small, individually and family owned businesses, not subsidiaries of multi-
corporate enterprises.  Moreover, there is some evidence that those who argued in favor of the
exemption were aware of the single employer doctrine in other contexts.274
V.  Conclusion: What Kind of Single Employer
 Doctrine Best Serves Title VII’s Purposes?
Tradition, statutory text, and Congressional intent do appear to support the single
employer doctrine, at least for matters of employer coverage under Title VII and the other major
federal employment discrimination laws.  What form should the doctrine take for this purpose? 
Must it necessarily follow the same four-factor test applied by the NLRB in collective bargaining
cases? And what of the doctrine’s suitability for other purposes under discrimination law, such as
treating affiliated corporations as one “respondent” for administrative purposes, applying the
right ceiling for compensatory and punitive damages,275 or piercing the corporate veil to make a
corporate parent or affiliate liable for the actions of a subsidiary?   Is the test of single employer
status  necessarily the same for every purpose?  Obviously, a conclusion that the single employer
doctrine is part of the law of Title VII is only the starting point leading to many other issues. 
Here are at least a few thoughts about the doctrine’s use and mechanics in cases of employment
discrimination.
First, it may be important to distinguish the doctrine’s different functions, particularly its
function as a rule of coverage versus its function as a rule of liability.   Nearly all the cases in
which courts accepted the doctrine involved issues of coverage, not liability.  To hold that a
corporation is covered by Title VII is one thing.  To say that a judgement against one subsidiary
276The question whether the single employer doctrine pierces the corporate veil gained
new importance in 1991 when Congress provided for compensatory and punitive damage awards
against in discrimination cases, and limited such awards according to the number of a
respondent’s employees.  See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, Title I, §102, codified
at 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b).  The question of piercing has also been particularly important in cases
under the WARN Act, where the nominal employer is typically in some financial distress.
277See text accompanying notes 67-68, supra.
is good against affiliate and parent corporations is another.276 The failure to distinguish these
two different functions may explain some of the recent resistence to the single employer doctrine. 
In Papa, for example, the issue was coverage, but Judge Posner rejected the single employer
doctrine and offered a substitute: the traditional grounds for piercing the corporate veil for
purposes of liability.277 True, much (but not all) of the history and analysis supporting the
doctrine as a rule of coverage might also support the doctrine for purposes of liability, but the test
for single employer status might nevertheless be different for each function.  These are issues for
another day.
Second, the four factor test that evolved for multiple functions in the law of collective
bargaining is not necessarily appropriate for distinguishing truly small firms built on personal
relationships and needing regulatory relief, from those that are part of a larger enterprise. 
Common ownership, especially complete common ownership, may be the most important factor
for purposes of entitlement to the small firm exemption.  On the other hand, Judge Posner may
be correct that the usual four-factor test places undue weight on a firm’s method of integrating its
administration and operations with the affiliates.  Whether a firm integrates any particular part of
its business by contract or affiliation may say little about its need for relief with respect to the
particular burdens imposed by employment discrimination law.  Consider, for example, three
separately incorporated restaurants owned by a single individual.  Like many small businesses,
the restaurants may have relatively little occasion to exhibit “integrated” personnel relations, and
any single restaurant could operate independently of the others.  On the other hand, the owner
might now indirectly employ as many as 42 individuals in three allegedly exempt establishments
in an industry with relatively high turnover.  Such an enterprise is not likely to be based on
personal relationships.  For example, the owner does enjoy some economies of scale in learning
the law.  What he learns in his role as manager of one restaurant is equally useful in his role in
another.   Common ownership also creates the potential for exploiting the advantages of a large
workforce, such as the ability to transfer workers from one establishment or division to another.
Finally, the single employer doctrine is often criticized for leading adversaries into a
painstaking and seemingly pointless examination of the details of interrelated businesses, such as
the sharing of common business forms, geographic proximity, common phone lines, and specific
business transactions together.  Much of this attention to details stems from the traditional
importance attached to integration of operations and personnel administration.  A test properly
adapted to the purposes of the single employer doctrine would begin with common ownership,
and would assign a strong presumption in favor of single employer status in the case of complete
or substantially complete common ownership.  The burden would then shift to the common
owner of the enterprise to prove that separately organized affiliates were particularly associated
with individuals or personal relationships, or that there are circumstances preventing the affiliates
from dealing with the burdens of employment discrimination regulation in the same manner as
other large enterprises.
Such a test might alter the outcome in many cases.  Firms with less than complete
common ownership but sufficient integration to qualify under the four factor test might not
qualify as a single employer under this revised test.  Firms with complete ownership but little
integration would not likely be a single employer under the traditional four factor test, but they
might under a revised test.  The result would more certainly vindicate the real goals of the small
firm exemption.
